OUR NAVIGABLE WATERS-POLLUTTED AND OTHERWISE by Koburger, Charles W., Jr.
449 
OUR NAVIGABLE WATERS-
POLLUTTED AND OTHERWISE 
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-
From the earliest colonial days, our 
navigable watcrs have scrved functions 
esscntial to the Nation's safety and 
cconomic wcll-bcing. Our bays and har-
bors, our Grcat Lakes, and our coastal 
and inland waterways are now used 
daily by thousands of commercial ves-
sels, foreign and domestic, from ocean 
liners to tankers to barges to fishing 
boats. Naval vcsscls stcam thcsc walers, 
as do ships of the Coast Guard, the 
Corps of Engineers, and othcr public 
agcncies. Recreational watercraft of all 
conceivable sizes also ply these waters-
impressive evidence of our material 
prosperity. 
As in other spheres of American life, 
the achievement of affluence has not 
been without expense to the quality of 
our natural environment. In and on the 
waler, this cost is pollution. The threat 
to our navigable watcrs lhrough pollu-
tion from vessels of all descriptions is a 
formidable one. 
Clcan Walcr. The Wall:r Quality Acl 
of 1965 (Public Law 89-234), now parl 
of the basic Federal watcr poilu lion 
control law, was cnacted "to enhance 
the qualily and value of our water 
resources and to establish a national 
policy for the prevention, control, and 
abatement of water pollution." Con-
gress unanimously passed the Water 
Quality Act and, under its provisions, 
for the first time, specific clean-water 
objectives became possible. Under it, 
lhe stales were permillcd lo plan lheir 
own specific water quality goals and to 
set time schedules for cleaning up their 
waters. The new law was especially 
designed, in fact, to allow the many 
economic and social interests in the 
states to determine jointly how available 
waters could he shared to fulfill all their 
various legilimate needs: rccreation and 
aeslhetics, fish and wildlife, municipal 
water supply, industry, agriculture, and 
maritime navigation. 
Once determined, the act calls for 
lhc slalcs lo suhmit their proposl:d 
standards, including crileria, plan and 
implcmenlalion, and cnforcemenl, lo 
the U.S. Deparlment of the Interior-
specifically, to its F~deral Waler 
450 
Pollution Control Administration 
(FWPCA)-for rcview and approval. 
Once approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior, the standards arc Icgally en-
forceable by both State and Federal 
governments. Enforcement of standards 
by either authority applies only to 
interstate waterways, however. (Federal 
law offers a financial bonus grant incen-
tive for treatment works discharging 
into waters for which standards have 
been set, whether intra or interstate.) 
Water quality standards include three 
essentials: 
1. Water Uses. As required hy the 
law, the states held public hearings to 
determine water uses desired for and 
appropriate to each stretch of their 
interstate and coastal waters. In most 
cases, several desired uses applied to the 
same stretch of water. Standards were 
set so as to permit the highest agreed 
use, thus requiring other users to bring 
their waste treatment up to this stan-
dard. After the hearings, state pollution 
control officials made the final decision. 
2. Criteria. Once uses were chosen, 
state authorities, in consultation with 
scientists, engineers, and other water 
experts, decided what substances and 
how much of each the waterway could 
absorb-and still be fit for the desired 
uses. These limits (in the act called 
"criteria") are expressed in terms of 
ranges or critical levels for such as 
suspended solids, heat biochemical oxy-
gen demands, coliform count, toxic 
material, et cetera. 
3. Implementation Plan. After decid-
ing uses and scientific criteria, state 
pollution control officials and technical 
experts surveyed municipal, industrial, 
and other wastes flowing into the waters 
to decide what type of treatment thesc 
wastes required to protect or improve 
the receiving waters. Then the authori-
ties developed specific, detailed plans to 
produce the desired watcr quality. 
Municipal and Industrial Wastcs. Thc 
most comJllon means of pollution con-
trol consists of a system of sewers and 
wasLc waLcr trcatnllmt plants. Till: 
sewcrs collcct waste water frolll homcs, 
businesses, and many industrics and 
delivcr it to treatment plants design cd 
to make it fit for reuse or discharge into 
receiving streams. Man-made treatment 
processes may be mechanical, biological, 
or chemical in nature. In cach casc thcy 
speed up the naLural processes by which 
water purifies itself. 
Primary treatment, a mechanical pro-
ccss, removes solids which will float or 
settle out of water. Called clarification 
or sedimentation because it "clears" the 
water of some of its turbidity (cloudi-
ness from suspended solids), primary 
treatment is the first step. If the waste 
water is then to be discharged dircctly 
to a receiving stream, the last step is 
chlorination to reduce the number of 
disease-causing bacteria in thc water. 
Primary trcatment removcs only about 
40 percent of the organic matter in 
waste water. The resulting effluent, if 
discharged to a stream, may still cause 
great harm. For example, the effluent 
may use up most or all of the stream's 
oxygen supply just to decompose the 
remaining waste. 
Secondary treatmcnt is a biological 
process which duplicatcs naturc's purifi-
cation mcthod by using bacteria to 
dccompose organic mattcr in thc wastc 
water. Morc bacteria arc uscd, and 
conditions are controlled, howevcr, to 
spced up treatment. Secondary treat-
mcnt can rcmove an additional 40 to 50 
percent of thc original organic mattcr in 
the waste water, giving an 80 to 90 
pcrccnt efficiency for a primary-
secondary plant. The final step in sccon-
dary treatment also is effluent chlorina-
tion. 
Tertiary trcatmcnt is nccessary in 
large mctropolitan and/or heavily indus-
trializcd arcas. Tertiary trcatment, 
esscntially a chcmical proecss, assumes 
the primary-sceondary stcps but gocs 
beyond them. It may include chemical 
treatmcnt in the following sequence: 
coagulaLion-sedimentation for addi-
Lional solids removal (and ovcr 90 prr-
cent reduction of phosphate concentra-
tion); filtration to remove all remaining 
turbidity, and absorption to remove 
over 98 percent of the organic matter 
which resists normal biological treat-
ment. If a reduction in dissolved salts is 
required, electrodialysis may be the 
final step. Electrodialysis is generally 
used only if the water will be reused for 
municipal or special industrial purposes. 
With complete treatment, these further 
steps can remove an additional 9 per-
cent of the original organic matter 
remaining, bringing total efficiency of 
the combined methods to 99 percent. 
Obviously, none of these three pro-
cesses stand alone. They must be used in 
combinations designed to handle each 
particular pollution control situation. 
Properly planned, these processes can 
produce any degree of pollution control 
desired. Water produced after full treat-
ment is of a quality suitable for any 
desired reuse-including water for 
drinking. 
Other Effluents. Thus far, we have 
dealt with measures directed primarily 
towards conventional wastes such as 
domestic sewage or pollutants generated 
by industrial processes. As these wastes 
come under control, the more diffuse 
sources will increase in relative signifi-
cance. Water quality deterioration 
resulting from such sources as spills and 
wastes from ships and other vessels will 
become more noticeable. I t is thesc 
nonpoint marinc-related sources which 
arc here referred to as other effluents. 
There necessarily will be wide varia-
tions among other effluents in the time 
and manncr in which their control will 
be required. In contrast to conventional 
forms of pollution for which standards 
require specific remedial acLions wiLhin 
specified time pcriods (gcnerally over a 
5-year period), standards are less spc-
cific with regard to these nonpoint 
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sources. The fundamental difficulty in 
dcveloping watcr qualiLY standards Lo 
cover oLhcr cffhwnLs is LhaL Lo dalc 
Lhcrc has hccn lillie effort Lo quantify 
the pollutional cffccts, thc cures, and 
the prevention costs associated with 
such problems. 
Wastes from Waterhorne Vessels. In 
the light of the Nation's stated resolve 
to restore and enhance the quality of 
our water, we cannot afford to ignore 
the wastes which issue from our water-
borne vessels. Indeed, logic alone de-
mands that both efforts proceed in 
tandem. The ports, estuaries, straits, and 
channels which see heavy maritime traf-
fic usually are located in areas of heavy 
population concentration. It makes lit-
tle sense to expect cities and industrics 
along these waters to clean up their own 
waste discharges only to have the water 
remain polluted by discharges from 
watercraft. 
The problem is widespread. Vessels, 
mohile, may trigger local pollution at 
any point along their path. Tank and 
freight ships are larger than they used to 
he. So are harges. They carry more 
varied cargoes such as chlorine gas, 
crude oil and its refined products of 
gasoline or oils, organic chemicals and 
pcsticides which, if spilled, persist for 
long periods of time to poison fish and 
changc the whole ecology of a river, 
estuary, or lake. Many commercial fish-
ing vessels are now designed as floating 
canneries; hoth canning wastes and crew 
sanitary wastes are discharged directly 
overboard wherever they operate. 
A recent (1967) FWPCA study of the 
pollution resulting from watercraft in 
the navigahle waters of the United 
States-the only one available-has pro-
duced the following findings: 
1. Approximately 46,000 docu-
mented commercial vessels, 65,000 non-
documentcd commercial fishing vcssels, 
1,500 Federal vessels, and eight million 
recreational watercraft use the navigable 
waters of the United States. In addition, 
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ahout tj.O,OOO foreign ship entrances are 
recorded each year for these waters. 
2. The pollutants that arc routinely 
discharged from vessels, and which de-
grade the waters to which they arc 
discharged, inelude sewage, oils, litter, 
bilge water, ballast water, wash waters, 
and chemicals. There are also accidental 
cargo spills. Sewage may contain danger-
ous concentrations of pathogenic orga-
nisms that cause diseases such as dysen-
tery, shigellosis, typhoid or paratyphoid 
fevers, gastroenteritis, and infectious 
hepatitis. Ballast waters may contain 
oils and may be' grossly polluted, dan-
gerous to public health, and highly 
objectionable in appearance and odor. 
3. Vessel sewage is discharged to 
waters of the United States from com-
mercial vessels, both United States and 
foreign, at an estimated rate (occupancy 
rate) equivalent to 199,000 persons; 
from federally operated watercraft, 
144,000; and from the perhaps 
1,300,000 recreational watercraft which 
are toilet equipped, 170,000. This esti-
mated total waste discharged from all 
watercraft-which may he somewhat 
high-thus in any case approximates the 
wastes from a city of 500,000 people. 
4. In most instances, untreated sew-
age is discharged from watercraft just as 
it has been since the beginning of 
navigation. 
5. Watercraft pollution can thus be a 
serious economic and health threat to 
many water-usc areas in the United 
States. Ships and boats may defile such 
critical areas as those used for body 
contact water sports, drinking water 
supplies, shellfish beds, and recreational 
lakes where organic wastes and nutrients 
foster algal nuisances and accelerate 
eutrophication. Such pollution can be 
grossly offensive and may adversely 
affect shoreline real estate and other 
property values. 
6. Beyond these most nagrant Oll-
the-scene abuses of the waters, pollution 
caused by vessels is often transient. Raw 
sewage and ballast water may be 
disgorged by a commercial vessel on the 
high seas today, only to foul the hathing 
heaches of Cape Cod, Miami, Galveston, 
or Big Sur tomOlTOw. 
7. Some 279,000 persons serve 
aboard the 1,500 federally operated 
watercraft. Generally, these 1,500 
watercraft do not have pollution control 
devices. As in the case of other sources 
of pollution, the Federal establishment 
has a special responsibility to show 
leadership by establishing effective pro-
grams to remedy this situation. 
Local estimates of pollution by hu-
man wastes from all waterborne vessels 
range from 0.2 percent of the drainage 
basic population to as high as 1 to 5 
percent in certain locations. But these 
arc just averages. The threat from recre-
ational watercraft, for instance, is con-
centrated on weekends, holidays, and at 
vacation periods. Thus, while the aver-
age pollution potential of just recrea-
tional watercraft is approximately equal 
only to that of a city of 170,000 
people, the pollution potential on a foul 
winter's day during the middle of the 
week may be almost zero, and that on a 
fair holiday weekend during the summer 
may be many times greater. Pleasure 
craft congregating for a weekend's fun 
may suddenly impose a load of un-
treated wastes equivalent to that of a 
good-sized town, and this in one small 
area. 
Harhors, lakes, and other heavily 
used navigable waters differ, of course, 
in their physical and hydrographic char-
acteristics and, in turn, in their charac-
teristics from the pollution control 
standpoint. A narrow-necked harbor, 
for example, may vary greatly from a 
relatively open bay or a wide I!stuary in 
terms of capacity to assimilate wastes 
without adverse consequence to other 
bl!ni!fieial uses. In given areas, therefore. 
vessel pollution may assume critical 
importane!: at an early stage; 011 other 
areas vessel pollution may be hidden by 
other discharges or so dispersed by tidr 
and current that it appears to he less 
critical. But the problem remains. 
Oil Pollution. The prohlem of water 
pollution from oil spills and its destruc-
tiv(! potential was dramatized hy the 
Torrey Canyon disaster in March 1967, 
when that tanker ran aground off the 
coast of England, spillin~ into the seas 
the 119,000 tons of cruele oil she was 
carrying. Oil spills, as well as the careless 
or accidental release of other hazardous 
materials to streams or in coastal areas, 
have long been of concern to water 
pollution authorities. The results can be 
serious: fish kills and harm to other 
marine wildlife; major aesthetic (and 
economic) damage. 
Oil pollution arises from many 
sources. Major sources inelude ships and 
other vessels, pipelines, shoresidc facili-
ties (terminals), and offshore oil rigs. 
Coping with these largely accidental 
pollution incidents requires an extensive 
surveillance program, alerting systems, 
reaction capability, and a contingency 
fund for cleanup purposes. 
Cleaning up an oil-contaminated area 
is time consuming, difficult, and costly. 
The British Government, for example, 
reportedly is trying to recover $8 mil-
lion from the owners of the Torrey 
Canyon for cleanup costs. This dol'S not 
take into account the cleanup costs to 
local governments and private agencies. 
The (:ventual real cost may rcach $25 
million. The total direct costs of clean-
ing up and of preventing our own oil 
pollution problems have not been 
worked out, but an oil spill is enormous-
ly expensive. The indirect costs-
whether commercial, recreational, or 
aesthetic-are difficult to estimate but 
they unquestionably are also tremen-
dous. 
Oil slicks move under the influence 
of wind and current. Wind is the domi-
nant factor with fresh spills on open 
watrr. SlIl'h a slick usually moves at a 
spel'd of 2 to 4 percent of the wind 
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velocity and, in the Northern Hemi-
sphere, slightly to the right of the 
direction in which the wind is blowing. 
(n the SOlltlwrII Ilemisphere, the move-
ment is to the left of the wind direction. 
In the absence of wind, in places such as 
rivers, and perhaps for older, heavier 
spills, current will tend to exercise 
greater control of a slick's movement. 
A rough estimate of the amount of 
heavy oil on the water can be made 
from the appearance of the slick. A 
harely discernible slick indicates 25 gal-
lons per square mile (gpsm). A silvery 
sheen indicates ahout 50 gpsm. Faint 
colors in the slick indicate 100 gpsm. 
Bright bands of color indicate 200 
gpsm. At a concentration of 600 gpsm a 
slick turns a dull brown. A dark-brown 
slick indicates 1,300 gpsm. 
Large crude oil slicks sometimes 
comhine with water to form a gelati-
nous emulsion called "chocolate 
mousse." The mixture may he as much 
as 70 percent water. Sea agitation of 
some types of crude oil will create this 
water-in-oil emulsion. 
When "chocolate mousse" is depos-
ited on a beach it tends, because of its 
sticky consistency, to stay on the sur-
face of the sand. Oil, on the other hand, 
depending on its consistency, may pene-
trate the heach. In either case, cleanup 
usually involves physical removal-
although the deeper the oil penetrates 
the sand the more difficult the cleanup 
prohlcm hecomes. 
A short composite summary of the 
priority of attack on oil spills-actual or 
potential-runs as follows: 
1. Salvage of the ship (if one is 
involved) or at least as much of her 
cargo as possible. Otherwise limit the 
spill at the source. After this, as neces-
sary: 
2. Containment of what has spilled 
by use of static and towable booms or 
other harriers. 
a. Removal of the oil from the water 
surfael~ hy physically picking it up 
(skimming or pumping) or by sinking, 
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burning, or chemically dispersing it. 
4. Shore cleanup, using straw, saw-
dust, polymers, or other sorbents; per-
haps chemicals; and/or variety of engi-
necr equipment to adsorb/absorb, wash, 
sandblast, burn, steam, and scrape. 
An important factor in almost any 
oil spill is the potential fire hazard. 
Distilled petroleum products, such as 
gasoline, benzene, and naphtha are the 
most flammable. These lighter petro-
leum products spread quite rapidly on 
water and, because of their high volatil-
ity, evaporate quickly. In open water, 
where no fire hazard is involved, wind 
and water action usually result in rea-
sonably fast dispersal and no cleanup 
action need be taken. Near a tanker, 
pier, terminal area, or other loeation 
where the fire danger is serious, spills of 
such products are usually contained and 
fire-preventive foam spread on the sur-
face of the slick. Subsequent evapora-
tion removes the slick. The foam returns 
to a liquid state and it dissipates. Alter-
natively, chemical oil dispersants may 
be applied, for safety. 
Heavier oil products rarely present as 
serious a fire hazard since their higher 
ignition point makes them more diffi-
cult to set ablaze. After a short period 
on the water, crude oil is difficult to 
ignite and attempts to burn off crude 
slicks in the open sea are usually unsuc-
cessful. The volatile fractions evaporate, 
leaving a heavy, sticky residue. This 
residue-gluey, persistent-is a prime 
pollution offender, however. 
The Federal Effort. In September 
1968, the five Federal agencies most 
concerned with oil pollution-Interior; 
Transportation; Defense; Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare; and the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness-published a 
jointly agreed to National l\lulti-agency 
Oil and HazlIrdous i\ hlterials Con tin-
geney Plan. Under Lhis plan, all signifi-
cant spills are monitored and reported. 
Where other Federlll response aeLions 
are required-because no one else can or 
will take the proper mcasures-Lhey will 
be taken. 
A Federal spill response can be di-
vided into five phases, elemcnts of any 
of which can be concurrent: 
1. Discovery of the spill, notification 
by whatever means, and classification. 
2. Containment and countermea-
sures, as appropriate and when neces-
sary. 
3. Cleanup and disposal of the pollu-
tant, avoiding further damage to the 
environment. 
4. Long-term restoration of the envi-
ronment, insofar as practicable. 
5. Recovery of damages and law en-
forcement; costs will be recovered from 
the spiller and legal penalties will be 
imposed. 
Under this plan, as amended, for 
most spills on our navigable waters 
except those caused by U.S. public 
vessels or federally-controlled facilities, 
the U.S. Coast Guard will provide an 
on-scene commander who initiates and 
directs all Federal response aeLions. 
(The exceptions-the Navy, for 
instance-provide their own on-scene 
commander.) In general, however, the 
spiller himself will be encouraged to 
take the corrective action and aetually 
carry out the cleanup, under supervi-
sion. 
The Coast Guard as well as Lhe Navy 
and other Federal maritime agencies are 
also already taking measures Lo clean up 
their own problems. Extensive research 
is bcing devoted toward the dcvclop-
ment of adcquate onboard sewage dis-
posal systems for all sizes of ships, large 
and small. At all shore facilities where 
required, i.e., where the facilities cannot 
be tied into regular municipal sewage 
systems, sewage treatment plants are 
being installed. Intensive education and 
training aimed at pollution prevention is 
being undertaken, especially in those 
areas involving the handling of oil. The 
rest is a matter of time, money, person-
nel, and authority. 
Other Measures. Three areas of 
marine-relaLed activiLy not yet touche..! 
on-all of Lhem Lechnical in characLer-
have considerahle potenLial for helping 
prevent, conLrol, andlor abate further 
poilu Lion of our waters; all arc receiving 
aLtention: 
1. Ship design and construction. 
Such facLors as the 10caLion, dimen-
sions, and strucLural proLection of a 
vessel's oil comparLments: the size, free-
board, speed, sLability, and maneuver-
ability of a vessel; and even the location 
of the wheelhouse are important to 
accident prevention and spill minimiza-
tion. The larger the tanker, the greater 
the threat, for instance. Various features 
of ship construction arc already subject 
Lo control by government, industry, and 
the insurance-connected classification 
societies. 
2. Ship movement. The best of indi-
vidual ship navigaLion practice by prop-
erly trained and licensed masLers and 
cn'WSj the exercise of 1I10rl' posiLivl' 
conLrol over Llw movemenL of oil und 
ha1.ar<ious eargoel'j Llw d('vel0l'n\(~n L 0 f 
Il!!W and the cxpanl'ion of exisLing ree-
ommmlded ship traffic lanes, aL leasL in 
congested areas; and the establishmenL 
of some form of shore-hased mariLime 
traffic guidance system would all work 
to increase ship safl!ly. 
3. Cleanup capability. The methods 
and hardware required for an adcquaLe: 
overall spill cleanup system have yet to 
he developed. Our spill cure capability is 
much better in quiet waters than in 
open sea, but both areas require im-
provement. Extensive research and 
development is underway by both Gov-
ernment and industry. 
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The Coast Guard thus plays a major 
role in the detection, investigation, and 
reporLing of marine pollution violations, 
cleanup of oil spills when required, and 
surveillance both for enforcement and 
cleanup purposes. It establishes 
merchant vessel design safety standards, 
carries ouL merchanL vessel safeLY in-
speeLions, documents and licenses mer-
chant personnel. I L esLablishes naviga-
tion procedures. It is responsible for 
research and development to prevent 
and "cure" offshore spills. It also helps 
formulate area contingency plans, 
organizing local responses Lo pOLential 
marine poilu Lion incidents. For each of 
Lhese Lasks LIII! CoasL Guard is well 
qualified hy its personnel, maLerial 
resources, and experience. 
Conclusion. The need to conLrol Lhe 
excessive and mostly unnecessary pollu-
tion of our navigable waters has heen 
hefore the public for some years. Most 
of the means required to stop this 
degradation of our water and to begin 
enhancing this resource over the total 
range of bendicial public uses are now 
either in hand or can be secured through 
legislative and other measures. Much 
new legislation is in fact being enacted. 
Marine-related pollution is just one 
of the sources of the problem, but 
noncllH'less a significanL one. Oil, sew-
llge~, liLLer, and oLher marine wasLes will 
reeeive ever inercasing pressure now and 
in Lhc fuLure. Spills will be avoided, or 
fought. 
This all means that our waterways 
should become gradually cleaner over 
the next 5 to 10 years, with improve-
ments showing by 1972. It is not Loo 
soon. 
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A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE RESOURCES 
OF THE SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF THE DEEP SEA: 
A BREWING PROBLEM FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKERS 
Horace B. Robertson, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Fall of 1967, in the Twcnty-
Se('orlll Session of the UniLcd NaLions 
(;cneral Assembly, the l{epresentaLive 
of :\lalLa introduced a Hcsolution which 
called UpOIl the General Asscmbly to 
take up a trealy whit'h would reservc 
tlw d('ep ocean hed and iLs rcsourees to 
Lhc lInited Nations to he exploited for 
the hcnefit of thc underdcveloped COIIIl-
tril's. This Hl':;olulioll was placed on the 
agl'llIla 111111 wa:< (It-batt'd in COJllmittet' I 
ancl in LII(: :\sscmbly, ,\Ithough the 
(;ml!'ral AS:<I'JJ1hly Ilid not appro\'e Lhl~ 
Ih-soluLion per S(' huL int'tead creaLed an 
.. td /Joe CommiLLee to sLudy all aspects 
of the matter and to report to the 
Twcnty-Third Session, the fact that it 
was even brought forward at that time 
carne as a surprisc to many. 
Thc emergence of the seabed of the 
deep ocean as a problem for interna-
tional decision makers was sudden and 
dramatic. Less than 10 years earlier a 
United Nations Conference on thc Law 
of the Sea had considered the problem 
remoLe, Even today man's activities on 
Lhe floor of the deep ocean are minis-
cule, and the eOllllllercial exploitation 
of the resoun:cs of the seabl:cI and 
suhsoillll'yollcl LII!' eontiJl(:IlL.t1 shl-If still 
rcmains f~r thc fuLure. Why, Lhell, has 
the legal sLatus of the deep ocean bed 
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become of such international concern 
that it is discussed today within the 
United Nations? Is the problem of such 
urgency that it merits such attention? If 
so, what is the framework within which 
solutions may be found? 
It is the purpose of this paper to 
explore these and related questions. The 
approach to the problem will be, first, 
to examine the technological develop-
ments of the last few years, and those 
promised for the next few, which have 
catapulted the issue to prominence. 
Then, after an examination of the cur-
rent status of the law of the sea, 
particularly as to its applicability to 
activities on the deep ocean floor, the 
paper will examine the types of seabed 
activIties which are projected for the 
future in order to establish a Lasis for 
determining the elements of a possible 
regime for the deep ocean bed and 
subsoil. This will be followed by an 
examination of several alternative 
regimes which might have applicability 
to the seabed as well as possible pro-
cedural and political methods by which 
a regime might be brought into beinl!. 
The interaction betwecn the political, 
lcgal and technological factors will forlll 
the basis for tentative conclusions, with 
particular em phasi? on the courses of 
action open to the United States in 
shaping a regime which would bc favor-
able to United States interests. 
I--THE PROBLEM EMERGES 
Recent Expeetations on Exploit-
ability of the Deep Ocean Floor. In 
January 1958, in a paper prepared by 
the Secretariat of the United Nations as 
a preparatory study for the 1958 United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, it was stated that it was probable 
that oil exploitation of the continental 
shclf would ultimately be conducted in 
waters as deep as :WO metcrs) Th(' 
papl'r prl'dictl·tl that \IIHler~ea tl'dl-
lIolog), might advance rapidly enough tu 
permit such exploitation to occur in as 
short a tillle as 20 years. With respect to 
the resources of the deep ocean hed, the 
paper was more pessimistic. It stated: 
In view of a certain fear of an ever 
outwards-moving boundary line of the 
legal 'continental shelf' an inquiry was 
also made into the question whether 
the ocean floor contains any exploit-
able minerals. The answers indicate 
that the sediment carpet covering most 
parts of the ocean floor does not 
contain minerals in any concentrations 
worthwhile exploiting. 
In one plate manganese ore has been 
found, but since this is availablc on 
land in sufficient quantity, exploita. 
tion from the ocean bottom is not 
necessary and would not pay. The 
sediment carpet, being extremely thick 
will in most places make cxploitation 
of laycrs undcmeath impossiblc. In the 
fcw places where the sediment is thin. 
ncr or non·existent formations may he 
found with the prospect of exploita. 
tion. Intrusions, such as the l'I1id-
Atlantic Ridge, might have mineral 
deposits associated with them. The 
depth will. however. be an insurmount-
able obstacle for exploitation for a 
long time to come. quite apart from 
the eommcrcial prospects which seem 
non-existent.2 
The l'onclusions in the papcr rl'-
flected the consensus of scientific and 
technical thought at that tilllc and scrve 
partly to explain the complete absence 
of eonsidcrlltion hy the 19;;B COII-
ference on thc Law uf thc Sea of till! 
legal status of the seabed and subsoil of 
the sea beyond the Continental Shelf.3 
But. like so many estimates and predic-
tions in this age of rapid teclmological 
advance, the eonclusions in that paper 
and those of the scientists and technolo-
gists upon whom it relied have proved 
conservative, and today, only 10 years 
after they were mude, techno\0I!Y hut' 
already outstripped the developmcnts 
predicted for 1978 or later, 
Current Capabilities and Predictions 
of the Future. In 19(16. IJ/lS;'I(,.~S J/'l'l'k 
n'IHlrll'd.lhal lIumhh' Oil and Hc'fillin~ 
Company had u:;c'd a remoll',oIH'ralecl 
drilling vessel to install a wcllhcucl at a 
632·foot (192 meter) depth off the 
California coast near Santa Barbara.4 
That was a record at that time, but hy 
October 1967, Global Marine, Inc., the 
commercial ocean drilling firm which 
sank the 632·foot well, was operating 
three commercial ocean drilling vessels 
capable of drilling oil wells to a depth of 
25,000 feet in water depths of 1,000 
feet (305 meters) and was reported 
about to put two additional vessels with 
similar capabilities into operation within 
a year.5 
In the field of exploration and scien· 
tific research, in 1967 the National 
Science Foundation awarded -a contract 
for obtaining ocean bottom cores up to 
2,500 feet long in water depths of 5,000 
to 20,000 feet.6 
Prohahly the development that has 
stimulated the most interest in the 
possibility of fommercial exploitation 
of the resources of the deep ocean bed 
is the discovery within recent years that 
vast areas of the ocean bottom are 
literally "paved" with manganese nod· 
ules. These nodules are mineral lumps 
found lying on the bottom of the ocean. 
Although their composition varies from 
location to location, they usually con· 
sist primarily of manganese, iron, nickel, 
cobalt and copper. Their origin is not 
fully understood, but it is generally 
helieved that they result from the col· 
lection of colloidal particles of the 
various elements as they filter down 
through the water, the colloids of man· 
ganese and iron attracting those of 
nickel, copper, cobalt and the other 
metals.7 Dr. John L. Mero, a leading 
expert on the techniques of undersea 
exploration and mining, has made a 
detailed study of the economic aspects 
of m!ning these nodules commercially 
using simple drag dredge techniques and 
has concluded that in depths of water 
up to about 5,000 feet the venture 
would ll(~ profilahlt,.B III Aup;lIst JI)(,7 
IIII' NI'wporl NI'ws ShiplJllil,lillp; allli 
I lryclock Company was awarded a 
patent 011 a vessel designed espccially 
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for mining manganese noclules.9 
But the known resources of the deep 
seabed are not limited to manganese 
nodules. Phosphorite, a valuable plant 
nutrient, is also found in nodules on the 
seabed in many areas of the ocean, 
generally in depths of 600 feet to 5,000 
feel. IO One abortive attempt has al· 
ready been made to mine a rich area a 
few miles off the California coast under 
U.S. Department of Interior license, but 
after extended exploration and trial 
dredging by the licensee, the allempt 
was abandoned hecause it was dis· 
covered that the bottom in this particu, 
lar area was also sprinkled with thou· 
sands of torpedo and naval gun shells 
left as an aftermath of decades of use as 
a Navy target range.! I Dr. Mero has also 
made detailed studies of the composi. 
tion of the "oozes" which make up the 
sediment covering the majority of the 
ocean bottom, and has determined that, 
far from being worthless, they could 
provide an inexhaustible and commer· 
cially exploitable source of calcium 
carbonate as a substitute for lime· 
stolle.! 2 
Despite thesl~ heady pr!'llil'lio11l; of 
things to come, it is nevertheless impor. 
tant to recognize that up to the present 
time, the only undersea mining that has 
bcen done commercially is limited to 
areas that arc fairly close illslu)('(! and 
are geologically a part of the continental 
shclf. As a prominent mining engineer 
stated at a recent institute: 
•.. I represent a group of practical 
mining people now engaged in under· 
sca mining around the world for a 
number of different minerals and in a 
number of ways. As a matter of fact, 
after hearing the scssion at the Marine 
Technology Society the other day, we 
made the calculation that if only 
people who were experienced in the 
ocean talked at such meetings and they 
only t;tlked about things they had 
adually dOIl(" illslt'ad of ahoul what 
Ih!'y prupo",~ 10 clo, it woulcl ('ul a 
Ihn'(' day IIlt'diug clown 10 ahoul ;11\ 
hour and fifteen minules. There is a lot 
of rather wild speculation about under· 
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sea mining, but thcrc is somc actually 
going on in thc worId.13 
Uncertain Status of the Resources of 
the Deep Seabed. The promise of riches 
from the sea and the predictions of 
rapid technological progress toward 
achieving commercial exploitation of 
them at ever greater depths have caused 
increased attention to be focused on the 
Icgal status of the seabed and subsoil of 
thc oceans beyond the continental shelf 
and on the mineral resources that may 
be extracted. Within the United Statcs 
the most prominent individual who has 
sought to attract attention to the prob-
lem has been Senator Claiborne Pell of 
Rhode Island. In a book published in 
1966 he stated: 
Because technology has not yet 
reached the stage of developmcnt whcn 
deep-sea mining is feasible, questions 
of who owns the decp sea floor have 
not been stud\cd seriously. But tech-
nology will develop quickly, and for 
some minerals in short supply deep-sea 
mining may be worthwhile very soon. 
Is the deep-sea mineral wealth to be 
taken by the first comer? It seems 
likely, at least now. If a deep-sea 
petroleum rig strikes oil at a mile 
dcpth, can the rigs of othcr nations sct 
up alongside and drill into thc samc 
poor? Such questions will not bc aca-
demic for long.14 
At thc prescnt time thcre is no 
answer to Scnator PeWs acadcmic ques-
tions. The 1958 Conference on the Law 
of the Sea adopted a Convention on the 
Continental Shelf which establishes the 
"sovereign rights" of the coastal state 
over the adjacent continental shelf for 
the purpose of exploring it and ex-
ploiting its natural resources.l 5 The 
Convention defines the shelf as that area 
of the adja,cent submarine area to a 
depth of 200 meters or " ... beyond 
that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploi-
tation of the natural resources. "16 
Beyond thc limi ts of thc contincntal 
shelf thcrc is no acccpted lcgal rcgimc, 
and, in fact, only recently havc legal 
scholars hegun to think seriously about 
the problem. 
Proposals for a Legal Regime. Within 
the United States, Senator Claiborne 
Pell has been in the forefront in pro-
posing clarification of the regime of the 
deep seabed. On 29 September 1967 he 
introduced a Senate Resolution calling 
for the United States to take the initia-
tive in obtaining an international agree-
ment which would declare that the floor 
of the deep sea and the resources of the 
seabed and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of the continental shelf, should be 
free for exploration and exploitation of 
all nations and incapable of coming 
under the sovereignty of anyone nation 
or group of nations. The Resolution also 
called for appropriate arms control 
measures for the deep ocean and for the 
calling of a conference for setting the 
outer boundaries of the continental 
shelf of each nation.l 7 On 5 March 
1968 he introduced a second resolution 
which submitted a draft of a proposed 
Ocean Space Treaty.l8 
Within the United States, at least two 
other influential groups have made simi-
lar suggcstions. In 1965 thc Commi tlec 
on Conservation and Dcvclopmcnt of 
Natural Resourccs of the White l\OIlSC 
Conference on International Coopera-
tion proposc!1 thc estahlishnwnL of II 
:;peciali;-.cd agcncy of tIll: 1Il1ill~d NII-
tions similar to those established for 
atomic energy and civil aviation which 
would have the responsibility of leasing 
mineral rights in the sea bottom and for 
promoting the development of these 
resources.19 In its 17th Report in 1966 
the Commission to Study the Organiza-
tion of Peace (the Research Affiliate of 
the United Nations Association of the 
United States of America) urged that 
the General Assembly should declare 
that no nation may appropriate the 
seabed beyond the continental shclf and 
rceommclilled thilt tlw (;mll'ml As-
sembly set III' :I spl~cial agency, III hll 
known as the United Nations l\'larine 
Resources Agency, to control and ad-
minisLer inLernaLional marine resources; 
hold ownership rights; and grant, lease 
or use them in accordance with the 
principles of economic efficiency.20 
On the international scene, the 
Geneva World Peace Through Law Con-
ference of 1967 passed a resolution on 
13 July 1967, recommending that the 
General Assembly issue a proelamation 
declaring that the non fishery resources 
of the high seas, outside the territorial 
waLers of any State, and the bed of the 
sea beyond the continental shelf, apper-
tain to the United Nations and arc 
subject to its jurisdiction and controI.21 
Of more significance, on 17 August 
1967, the Permanent Mission of Malta 
to the United Nations proposed that the 
General Assembly should, in its twenty-
second (1967) session, take up a treaty 
concerning the reservation to the United 
Nations of the seabed and ocean floor 
and the explJitation of the resources 
thereof for the benefit of under-
developed eountries.22 This item was 
included on the agenda for the twenty-
second session and discussions were hcld 
in the Political Committee in November 
and December 1967. Primarily through 
the efforts of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. subsLantive aCLion on the 
item was postponed by the device of 
appointing a Committee on the Oceans 
(patterned after the previous outer 
space committee) to study the proposal 
further and report to the twenty-third 
session.23 
Thus, although action of the General 
Assembly has provided a grace period, 
the time for substantive decisions on the 
legal status of the seabed and subsoil of 
the deep ocean seems to be ap-
proaching. 
Summary. The foregoing brief back-
/,'l"ollJ1d suggests the growing importance 
of the seahed to the world cOlllmuniLy 
anti the inerl~asin~ lIllcnLion iL is rl'-
cci\'in~. noL only from scienlists anti 
technologists, but also from national 
and inLernaLional decision makers. In 
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SII hscq ucn L chllp Ler~, Lhis pnper will firsL 
revicw the current framework of inler-
national law wiLhin which or as an 
extension of which solutions to the 
problems posed might be found. It will 
then examine the current and projected 
activities on the deep seabed. With these 
as a basis, the paper will then examine 
several alternative regimes which might 
have applicability to the seabed as well 
as possible procedural methods by 
which a regime might be brought into 
being. Finally, tentative conclusions will 
be stated. 
II-THE CURRENT STATE 
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
As an initial step in attempting to 
explore a possible regime for the bot-
tom of the deep ocean, it is necessary to 
examine the current status of the law of 
the sea, the regimes that apply to the 
various segments of the sea and the 
boundaries of those segments, with par-
ticular attention to the legal regimes 
applicable to the seabed and subsoil. 
Perhaps the most logical order for such 
a consideration is to look at the sea 
starting al the land and proceeding 
outward. Not unsurprisingly, as one 
proceeds outward from the land, and as 
the connection belween the land and 
the sea hccomcs more remote, the law 
applicable on the land has less and less 
applicability to the sea, seabed, and 
airspace ahove the sea. 
Internal Waters. The waters most 
close inshore are called internal waters. 
These waters are those enclosed within 
the baseline from which the territorial 
sea is measured. The baseline generally 
follows the low-water mark along the 
coast, but in some cases, such as the 
mouths of some bays and rivers and 
along coasts d"eeply indented or fringed 
hy 11IImerOllS islantls, it lIlay he a 
stmight linc following the gcncntl con-
figuration of the coast. For internal 
waters, the sovereignty of the coastal 
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state is eompleLe, noL only as Lo Lhe 
waters, but also as to the airspace above 
and the Ileahed and subsoil beneath. 
They are in the same legal status as the 
land territory of the state'! 
The Territorial Sea. The next bclt 
outward from the bascline is the terri-
torial sea. It is a belt whose inner limit is 
the baseline and whose outer limit is the 
line every point of which is at a distance 
from the nearest point of the baseline 
equal to the breadth of the sea.2 The 
Territorial Sea Convention explicitly 
declares that the sovereignty of the 
coasLal sLate exLends to this narrow helt. 
Such sovereignty includes the sea, the 
seabed and subsoil and airspace above.3 
Essentially the only difference between 
the territorial sea and inLernal waters is 
that the ships of foreign nations have 
the right of innocent passage through 
the terriLorial sea but do not have such a 
right in inLernal waters.4 Aircraft do not 
enjoy a right of innocent passage 
through the airspace above the terri-
torial sea.5 
The 1958 United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea codified a great 
deal of the international law pertaining 
to the territorial sea, but neither that 
Conference nor a similar Conference 
held in 1960 was able to obtain agree-
ment of a sufficient number of parLici-
paLing staLes to eSLablish a precise 
breadth of the territorial sea. The 
United StaLes has always claimed a 
3-mile wide territorial sea.6 Most of the 
maritime states likewise claim such a 
narrow territorial sea. On the other 
hand, a great number of states today 
claim broader territorial seas--a number 
claiming 6 miles, quite a few 12 miles, 
and several extending their claims as far 
as 200 miles.7 The United States has 
repeatedly stated Lhat it does not recog-
nize any claim beyond 3 miles.8 
The Contiguous Zone. Proceeding 
outward frolll the tl'rritorial sea, till' 
next belt is callcd the contiguous zone. 
The 1958 Territorial Sea ConvenLion 
empowers a eoasLal sLaL(~ to (':;tahlish 
such a zone beyond its territorial sea in 
which it may exercise the controlneees· 
sary to prevent and punish infringement 
of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and 
sanitary regulations within its territory 
of territorial sea. It may not, how(:ver, 
extend beyond 12 miles from the base-
line.9 
It is to be noted that with respect to 
the contiguous zone, the coastal state 
does not exercise the full bundle of 
powers constituting sovereignty but 
only a limited control or jurisdiction. 
The waters of the contiguous zone are a 
part of the high seas. The airspace ahove 
them is free for the passage of foreign 
aircraft, and (except as indicated below 
as to the continental shelf) the coastal 
state has no special claim as to the 
seabed or subsoil.! ° Although a number 
of statcs, including the United States, 
have claimed exclusive fishing rights 
within the contiguous zone, such claims 
are not made on the basis of the 
Territorial Sea Convention but depend 
on the practice of states.!l 
The Continental Shelf. Although the 
geological conLinental shelf usually 
underlies the waLers of both tl\(' t(~r .. i-
Lorial sea and the conLiguous zone, iL is 
considered afLer Lhese two zones be-
cause its outer limiL lIlay cxtelul heyonli 
the houndaries of either. 
Geologically, the continental shelf is 
the submerged extension of the conti· 
ncntal landmass which slopes gently 
seaward from the low-water mark to a 
point where a substantial break in grade 
occurs. Generally, this break occurs at 
about 100 fathoms, but this is by no 
means uniform. The width of the conti· 
nental shelf varies greatly. In some parts 
of the world, such as off the coasts of 
Peru and Chile, it lIIay be virtually 
noncxistent. In other areas, such as 
some parts of tht' ell!'t eoatlt of the 
lInilt'd Statl'S and thl' (;nlf of 1\II'xit·n. it 
lIlay he several iruruJred miles wilk I:! 
AILhough the United Kingdom amI 
Venezuela cntcrcd into a treaty in 19 .. t~ 
by which they divided petroleum ex-
ploitation rights beneath thc Gulf of 
Paria betwccn them,13 the event whieh 
had thc most impact on the dcvelop-
mcnt of the law of the continental shelf 
was a Proelamation by Prcsident Tru-
man in 1945 which declared that 
..... the Government of the United 
States regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and seabed of the conti-
nental shelf beneath the high seas but 
contiguolls to the coast of the United 
States as appertaining to the United 
States, Sll bjed to its jurisdiction and 
eontrol."14 The Proclamation made no 
attempt to define or set an outer limit 
on the continl!ntal shelf. However, the 
press release accompanying the Proc-
lamation stated, "Generally, submerged 
land which is contiguous to the conti-
nent and which is covered by no more 
than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is 
considered as the continental shelf. "15 
It remained for the 1958 U.N. Law 
of ~h? .Sea Conference to provide a legal 
defnutlOn and an outer limit of the 
continental shelf. Article 1 of the Conti-
nental Shelf Convention defines the 
continental shelf as the seabed and 
subsoil of the high seas adjacent to the 
coast to a depth of 200 meters or, 
beyond that depth, to where the depth 
of the superjaccnt water permiL'> the 
exploitation of the natural rcsources of 
such arc as. The coastal state is given 
" ... sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring L the contincntal shelf] and 
exploiting its natural resources. "16 The 
convention explicitly provides, however, 
that the rights exercised by the coastal 
state ovcr the continental shelf shall not 
affect the legal status of the waters 
above .the shelf as high seas, or that of 
the airspace above those waters.17 
~hus,,, the coa~tal state's "sovereign 
rights are restricted to the seabl,d and 
suh~oi1. ~hips mill airaart :trt' rrt'I' ttl 
COlli!' and go in th!' wall'rs mill air~pa,'" 
above the continental shelf with essen-
tially the same freedom as they have on 
463 
other parts of the high seas. 
The High Seas. All waters not in-
cluded within the territorial sea or the 
internal waters of a slate are high seas. 
The .1?58 Convcntion on the High Seas 
sp~elfIcally provides: "The high seas 
hel.ng open to all nations, no Stale may 
vahdly purport to suhject any part of 
t~lem to its sovcreignty."lB This provi-
sion must, of course, be read in context 
with the other articles of the Conven-
tion and with the Conventions on the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf. 
These provide for lhe excrcisl~ of SOIlIl: 
of the clcmcnts of sovereignty hy 
coastal statcs over certain areas of the 
high seas and over certain activities 
occurring on the high seas, as has 
already hcen seen. Bul it is saf!! to say 
that .generally the regime of thc high 
seas IS one of freedom. The High Seas 
Convention specifically enumerates the 
following freedoms as appertaining to 
the high seas for all States, coastal and 
noncoastal: freedom of navigation; free-
dom of fishing; freedom to lay sub-
marine cables and pipelines; and free-
dom to fly over the high seas. It also 
specifically states that this list is not 
exclusive. The Convention provides that 
the freedoms of the high seas are lo be 
exercised by all states" ... wilh reason-
ahle n'gard lo the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the fn!e(iom 
of the high SI!as. "J I) 
The freedom of the high seas is 
protected, not hy the cxcreise of juris-
diction by a supranational body or by 
coastal states, but by the principle of 
the "flag state." Under this principle, 
persons who conduct activities on the 
high seas must operate under the flag of 
some nation, which is then responsihle 
for and has jurisdiction over activilies 
conducted under ils flag.20 
EXI'~pl us to thc freedom to lay 
~lIhlllarllll' l'ahll's anti pipdinl'~, thl' Ili!!I1 
~I'a~ CI)IJ\'('ntiou i8 8ill'nt a8 to till~ 
seabed and suhsoil. Thus, beyond the 
edgc of the Continental Shelf, about 
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\\ hich more will he :;aid below. there arc 
no provisions of LreaLy law applicable to 
the resources of the seahed and su bsoil 
of the high seas. Since man's exploiLa-
tion has to this date becn essenLially 
limiLed to the ConLinenLal Shelf, there is 
110 praeLicc of sLaLe:> l'uffil'il'nL to esLab-
lish any cusLomary inLernaLiollal law on 
this suhjcet. 
Figure ] depicLs in visual form the 
divisions of the ocean already discussed. 
Figure 1.--Legal Divisions of the Oceans 
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The Outer Limi L of the Continental 
Shelf. Before pr<)(;eeiling Lo analyze 
possihle alLc:rrwtive regimes for the sca-
hed and subsoil of the deep ocean, it is 
necessary to eont'icler one lIIore pre-
liminary il'slIe. ThaL is the contention, 
advanced by somc'. thaL such a regime 
already exi::;ts. The argument for this 
con Len Lion is hasc,d on the wording of 
Artielc ] of thc ContinenLal Shelf Con-
venLion, which reads as follows: 
For the purpose of these articles, 
the term 'contincntal shclf' is used as 
referring (a) 10 the sl'abl'd and subsoil 
of the submarine areas adjaccn t to the 
coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters 
600 meters 
or, heyond that limit. to where the 
depth of th,' superjacent waters atimils 
of the exploitation of till' natural 
rcsourccs of the said areas: (h) to the 
seabed and suhsoil of similar suhm:lrinc 
arcas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
Thc definition for the ouLer limit of 
the conLinental shelf is thus Lwofold. 
Either it is at the poinL at which the 
depth of water reaches 200 meLers or, at 
the point heyond that dc'pth at which 
the state of teeilllological development 
at any particular moment permits the 
exploitation of Lh(· natural resources of 
the seabed and su bsoil. Based on this 
seconr!, flexihle crit('rion for dc:ter-
mining the outer edge, 80l11e have 
argued that as technolobrical advanccs 
pcrmit exploitation of rcsources in 
dcepcr and deeper water, the boundary 
moves further and further to sea. Ac-
cording to proponents of this theory, 
the only limit to such extensions out-
ward from the coastal state is the 
median line between opposite coastal 
states.21 
This result, while having the facile 
attraction of simplicity and being in 
accord with the literal words of the 
Convention, does not appear properly 
to reflect the intent of the Convention. 
A brief examination of the background 
and ncgotiating history of the 195B 
Convention will help in determining the 
true intent and meaning of Article l. 
The difficulty faced by the delegates 
to the Confercnce was that they were 
trying to provide a precise and certain 
legal definition for a geological concept 
which was not precise and certain. 
Additionally, as stated by the U.S. 
spokesman on the Continental Shelf 
CommiLLee, " ... thc Conference was 
tingell with politics. "22 
The Conferencc had as a basis for 
initial discussion a draft convention 
developed by the I ntcrnational Law 
Commission (ILC) over a period of 
several years.23 I\lr. Garcia-Amador, the 
representative of Cuba and a noted 
international lawyer who was also a 
memher of the ILC, pointed out that 
the limit of (,xploitability criterion was 
accep ted hy thc I LC in 1951, dropped 
in 1953 and then readopted in 1956 as a 
result of the unanimous resolution 
passed at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Conservation of Natural 
Resources: Continental Shelf and 
Oceanic Waters held at Ciudad Trujillo, 
Dominican Rcpuhlic, in early 1956. He 
stated that the ILC draft text had both 
a moral and a legal basis in that it 
covered thc needs both of countries 
with a continental shelf and of those 
whose adjacent submarine areas did not 
meet the currently accepted definition 
of the continental shelf but were never-
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theless rich, exploitable areas. lie 
pointed to Chile as one of the special 
cases hrought to the aLLentiotl of the 
1LC. Coral reefs off the coast of Chile 
were exploitahle to depths of perhaps 
1,000 metcrs and could not thercfore be 
considered as part of the continental 
shdf in the accepted geological sense. 
"Nevertheless, it was only ri!!ht that 
such cases should he taken into account, 
and the criterion of possihle exploita-
tion had been acccpted with the ohjeet 
of doing justice to all states. "24 Thus, 
there is nothing in the history of the 
dcvelopment of the draft convention by 
the ILC to suggest that the ILC con-
ceived of the houndary as subject to 
limitless outward expansion. The prob-
lem they sought to meet by the ex-
ploitability criterion was rather the case 
of exploitahle seabed resources in 
waters which, though close inshore, 
were decper than 200 meters. 
At the Geneva Confcrence the discus-
sions of the I LC draft article which 
eventually hecame Article I of the 
Convention, the definition Article, 
developed into a dehate hel ween advo-
cates of a fixed criterion and those who 
advocated the exploitahility criterion. 
Although some delegates pointed to the 
possible danger thaI the literal words of 
the flexihle exploitahiJity criterion 
might lead to limitless outward exten-
sions of coastal state jurisdictiol1,25 the 
principal argument expressed by those 
who favored a singh~, fixed criterion was 
thaL the vagueness of the exploitahility 
criterion would lead to disputes be-
tween states.26 The adherents of the 
exploitahility crit('rion based thcir view 
principally on three l-,'I"OUlllls, namely (1) 
the fact that a ~OO meter depth did not 
necessarily define the edge of the conti-
nental shelf in a geological sense--in 
sOllie areas the edge was at I-,'I"eater 
depths;27 (~) the (;arcia-Amador argu-
ment of justice for those coastal staLes 
which had no continental shelf in the 
geological sense;2!l and (B) the fact that 
in 1%8 the continental shelves of the 
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world were largely unexplored and that 
it would be unwise to establish a fixed 
criterion for defining a geological phe-
nomenon about which so little was 
known.29 None of the adherents for 
this position suggested lhat thcy viewed 
the exploitability criterion as a basis for 
indefinite extensions of the "legal" 
continental shelf seaward. 
The principle of "adjacency," which 
is ineluded in the Article 1 definition, 
was impliedly recognized in the argu-
ments of many delegates. However, only 
one speaker pinned this point down 
preCisely, and although he was not 
expressly supported by representatives 
of other governments, neither did any-
one express disagreement with the 
proposition he expressed. He was the 
delegate of the Dominican Republic, 
who stated: 
The thought underlying that Article 
was that the continental shelf was a 
prolongation of the land and, there-
fore, subject to considerations of con-
tiguity or proximity. Exploitation be-
yond thc point at which the relation· 
ship of proximity ended might be 
based on occupation, but it would not 
be covered by the provisions of Arti-
cles [1 and 2].30 
Thus, although the record is not 
completely free from doubt, it seems 
reasonably elear from the history of the --
development of the Article 1 definition 
that the framers of the Continental 
Shelf Convention did not intend, by 
that Convention, to allocate the re-
sources of the deep ocean floor among 
the coastal states of the world. This 
interpretation is shared by a number of 
seholars who have researched the sub-
ject.31 Further, this interpretation is 
implicit in the current consideration of 
the subject in the United Nations. 
Otherwise, the United Nations would be 
engaging in a pointless debate on a 
subject which had already been resolvcd 
by the 1958 Geneva Conference. 
Nonetheless, the boundary is im-
precise and ambiguous. As a result, any 
program for the establishment of a 
regime for the deep seahed (other than 
coastal state jurisdiction) would have to 
have as one of its e1cments thc establish-
ment of a more precise outer boundary 
for the continental shelf. 
It is the ocean floor beyond that 
boundary--whatever it may eventually 
be--with which the remainder of this 
paper is concerned. 
II1--SEABED AND 
SUBSOIL ACTIVITIES 
In this chaptcr there wiII he an 
examination of the types of activities 
projected for the seabed and subsoil of 
the deep ocean, an appraisal of the 
United States interests in each of such 
activities, and an allempt to define 
criteria, based on each kind of activities, 
for developing a regime covering these 
activities. 
Exploration and Research. Despite 
the fact that man has traveled on the 
surface of the sea since the beginning of 
recorded history and has used the sea as 
a source of food for perhaps even a 
longer period, he knows wry littlc 
about the ocean depths and particularly 
the bottom of the sea. Man has photo-
graphed and mapped the back side of 
th~ moon 240,000 miles away, but hc 
has "explored only about !) J1(:r<~(:Jll of 
the bottom of the seas which comprisc 
71 percent of the earth's surface'! For 
the foreseeable future, therefore, the 
most prominent activity with respect to 
the bottom of the deep ocean will 
undoubtedly be exploration and re-
search. Such exploration and research 
are a necessary prelude to productive 
uses of the deep ocean floor. 
The United States, as one of the 
leading users of the oceans for both 
peaceful commerce and national dc-
fense, has a preemincnt interest in 
fostering exploration and research in the 
deep oceans. But only in rc:ccnt years 
has that interest been given very great 
attention. Only a few years ago, ocean-
ography was an obscurc scicntific disci-
pline practiced mostly at a few highly 
specialized institutions, such as the 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute at 
Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and the 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography at La 
Jolla, California. Even the Navy did not 
accord it a very prominent place as 
evidenced by the fact that until quite 
recently responsibility for o.ceanography 
was divided between several offices, the 
principal oncs being the Office of Naval 
Research and the Navy Hydrographic 
Office. It was not until 1966 that the 
Hydrographer of the Navy, whose 
primary function had been the provision 
of charts and navigation publications to 
the Navy, was redesignated as the 
Oceanographer of the Navy and given 
full responsibility for coordination of 
the entire Navy Oceanographic Pro-
gram.2 
Today, however, the field of ocean-
ography and related sciences are receiv-
ing much more attention. The oceans 
have become a "glamour" scientific and 
engineering subjcct. Bctween 1963 and 
1967 total annual expcnditures (govern-
mcnt and private) more than doubled, 
rising from approximately $1 billion per 
year to an annual rate of over $2 
billion.3 The U.S. Government research 
and development programs took an even 
more dramatic jump--frolll $24 million 
in 1958 to $220 million in 1967.4 Giant 
aerospace companies, some with no 
prior experience in the field, have 
suddenly taken an interest in it now 
that the government has allocated large 
research and development funds.S As a 
result of the intense and increasing 
concern that the United States 'should 
have a comprehensive and well-
coordinated plan for exploitation of the 
oceans, Congress enacted the Marine 
Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment Act of 1966.6 This Act estab-
lished the National Council on I\iarine 
Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment in the Executive Office of the 
President to advise and assist the Presi-
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dent in the planning and conduct of a 
coordinated Federal program in marine 
science and technology. Indicative of 
the importance attached to the program 
by the President and the Congress, the 
Council is headed by the Vice President 
and includes in its membership the 
Secretaries of State, Interior, Com-
merce, Health, Education and Welfare, 
Transportation, and Navy, the Chairman 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
the Director of the National Science 
Foundation.7 
It is thus apparent that the United 
States has now embarked on a compre-
hensive program of exploration and 
research in the oceans. Although no 
authoritative figures showing the per-
centage of the total oceanography effort 
which is devoted to exploration of tbe 
sea bottom are available, the emphasis 
which is being placed on deep diving 
submersibles indicates that it is large. 
Within the United States alone a great 
variety of deep diving experimental sub-
mersibles is already in operation and 
more are planned. Many of these are 
sophisticated manlled vessels, capahle of 
exploring the deep cst portiolls of the 
ocean bottom and providing a great deal 
of information about it.S 
Since research and exploration do 
not gcnerally contcmplatc the construc-
tion of expensive bottom installations 
or the removal of large quantities of 
bottom material, most favorable for 
exploration and research would be a 
regime under which maximum freedom 
is preserved-freedom of access to all 
areas of the sea bottom, freedom to 
take samples of the seabed and subsoil, 
freedom to map and take photographs, 
freedom to construct temporary instal-
lations on the bottom, and the Iike.9 
The only desirable restriction is that 
those engaged in research or exploratory 
activities be protected from hazards, 
such as underwater collisions, jettison-
ing of objects from above, and fouling 
of working and safety lines. 
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Extraction of Mineral Resources. As 
has been touched upon in Chapter I, the 
excitement about the seabed and the 
interest 011 the part of some to inter-
nationalize it has been brought about by 
the discovery that the seabed (and 
perhaps the subsoil) is a potential source 
of valuable mineral resources. Although 
the extraetion of such resources is so far 
essentially limited to the continental 
shelf and generally to the shallower 
parts thereof, any regime for the deep 
ocean bed must take account of the 
potential exploitation of its mineral 
resources. 
The most interest has been excited 
by the manganese nodules which arc 
found over vast areas of the ocean fioor. 
Phosphorite nOllules also hold the 
promise of early exploitation. l\Ian's 
ever-ex panding demands for new 
sources of raw materials may push him 
to exploit these much earlier than was 
thought possible only a few years ago. 
One observer has stated it thus: 
... while rising demand squeezes tradi· 
tional supplics and pushes [raw ma-
terial] prices up, a rapidly developing 
technology is pushing down thc cost of 
working ocea.nie resources. Whcncver 
these rising price and lowering cost 
curves cross, man turns to the sea.! 0 
Dr . .lolm P. Craven, Chief Scientist of 
the Navy's Deep Submergence Project 
and a promincnt authority in lhc ficld, 
has suggesled that. the time when this 
will occur may not be too far away: 
It has been suggested by some that 
the problem of deep ocean mining is 
remote and that exploiters will be 
relatively few. The presumption here is 
the projectcd high cost for vehicles and 
equipment designed to operate on the 
ocean bottom. On the contrary, al· 
though thcy do not exist a.t pres('nl. it 
is contended that low cost vehicles 
capable of exploitation nrc leclmolop;i. 
cally feasible amI will be realized with. 
in thr nl'xl two (lI'calll's. .., 11 has 
come as a ~1Irpri<'l' to Ih(' uniniLiah'II, 
alltl ('ven 10 S(lIIl!' prof('~~ional naval 
arehitl'cls, that at pn'~l'nt the major 
invrstment cost of dcep submersibles is 
in thc surface ships and sllrface support 
systems now rcquirrd for their opcra-
tion. That is prcfCnUy thc case be-
causc, except for static pressurc, the 
greatcst forces and most dangerous 
dynamies are at or near the surface and 
its attendant wave system. 
In summary, the projection of deep 
ocean technology is slIeh that, in the 
period beyond 1930, we may expect a 
significant proliferation of nonmilitary 
submersible and low-cost equipment 
capable of operating throughout the 
water column at or on the bottom and 
capable of exploiting the sea bed or the 
resources of the sea bed.l1 
For the mining of manganese nodules 
and phosphorite nodules, however, man 
probably will not have to wait until 
such bottom operating vehicles are 
available. These resources could prob-
ahly he cOlllmercially exploiLed now, 
utilizing simple drag or dredge lech-
niques. Likewise, the industry has al-
ready demonstrated its capabiliLy for 
drilling oil wells in water over 200 
meters deep. Thus, any regime for the 
ocean bed must take inLo account the 
reality of already initiated activities 
directed toward the exploitation of 
mineral resources. 
For a drag or drcd~e type sea floor 
mining operation, the investment and 
preliminary development expenses for 
lhe enlrepreneur would be extremely 
I J? J' . . I' arge. - 'or any opl.'ralion lI\VO vlllg 
c}"lcllsivc drilling or suh~oil extraction, 
expenses would obviously be much 
greater.l 3 Thus, the key element of a 
rCbrimc which would make possihle the 
exploitalion of the mineral resources of 
the subsoil and seabed would be an 
assurance to the developer that, once he 
has made a largc inveslmenL, he will 
havc some measure of exclusivily lo 
protect him from "claim jumpers." As a 
'"ading aUlhority, Dr. ALhl'h;Lan Spil-
haus of the University of i\linnesola, has 
staled: 
If we are ~oing to rxploit til(' <'I,n hy 
privah- illllnsiry. W(' II1l1sl work 0111 
laws Ihal ('om ~ivl' :<1)1111' killil of a 
patt'nt or grant <'I) Ihat LhoS!~ who risk 
rapital in its exploitation can be as-
sun'd a reasonahle reward.1·~ 
There arc various possihilities, still to he 
explored, how thi& exclusive right to 
exploitation could be acquired; this, 
however, would appear to be a matter 
of secondary importance to the exploit-
ing entrepreneur. His primary interest 
would be in obtaining sufficient assur-
ance that, under the usual business risk 
principles, he would have an oppor-
tunity for sufficient profit to compen-
sate him for the financial risks involved. 
The community interest in developing 
the resources of the seabed would, in 
tum, be served by providing this assur-
ance.l 5 
Living Resources. The claim is often 
made that the population explosion will 
soon exhaust the food resources of the 
land areas of the earth and that man will 
increasingly tum to the sea as a source 
of practically unlimited animal protein. 
But if this is to occur, man must 
markedly improve his harvest of the 
Jiving resources of the sea. It has been 
estimated that in 1964 only 4 percent 
of the ocean's actual production of 
Jiving resources of the kind that man 
was harvesting were actually har-
vested.l 6 This small output results 
primarily frbm the fact that the 
methods used today for harvesting the 
sea are still basicully those of the huntcr 
of wild allillluis on lund. Improved 
equipment and methods, together with 
much research, have resulted in marked 
improvements over the past few years 
and further improvements are prom-
ised.l7 However, many insist that the 
best way to utilize the sea is to adapt 
the ways of land agriculture to the sea. 
They visualize vast fish farms, fenced 
off by walls of huhbles in which fish are 
grown just as cattle are on modern land 
ranches.l B Although such schemes may 
sound farfetched, similar processes are 
already in use in many areas of the 
world for cultivation of mollusks, dams, 
oysters, culturt,tl Pl'UrlS mill, to u limitl'll 
extent, fish.l9 A number of prominent 
scientists have given their support to 
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them as heing prael icnl, at least in the 
shallower, well-aerated parts of the 
ocean.20 The limitntion to the shallow, 
well-aerated portions of the sea makes it 
likely that most of the sea floor activi-
ties connected with such fish farms 
would be confined to the continental 
shelves. Consequently, activities con-
nccted with the living resources of the 
sea should have little impact on a regime 
for the deep seabed. 
Disposal of Wastes. Since time im-
memorial the sea has been used as a 
dumping ground for wastes. Because of 
the vastness of the oceans and the 
variety and abundance of sea life, the 
seas have been able to turn most of 
these wastes into valuable nutricnts or 
at worst dilute them enough to be 
harmless.21 With the coming of the 
nuclear age, however, a new problem 
has been introduced-radioactive wastes. 
The same qualities which made the 
ocean an attractive dumping ground for 
conventional waste products have made 
it attractive for disposal of radioactive 
wastes.22 Although such radioactive 
wastes take a number of forms (e.g., 
coolant fluids from shore-based or ship 
nuclear power plants, liquid wastes from 
nuclear manufacturing plants or plants 
Cllgllgcd ill revitalization () f fud for 
nuclear plants,23 the only kind which 
would be within the scope of the 
current paper would be solid wastes 
which would come to rest on the ocean 
floor. At the present time, the U.S. 
practice is to bury highly contaminated 
radioactive wastes on land. Only the 
slightly contaminated refuse created by 
day-to-day operations of nuclear re-
actors. such as gloves, clothes, and rags, 
is scaled in containers for (It'positing in 
deep recesses of the ocean.24 Because 
of the increasing prominence of nuclear 
power and the ever greater quantities of 
fOlIlioOll"ti\'c resil\uI's that will ),1' ('reatl'li 
in futurc years, llOwl'vl~r, this U~l! of the 
deep ocean and its floor will prohably 
increase. 
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Such use, however, does not have to 
be exclusive in the sense that only one 
nation or individual could use a particu-
lar area. It will be necessary, however, 
to insure that such wastcs, once placed, 
not be disturbed until they are no 
longer a radioactive hazard. 
Defense Activities. A detailed discus-
sion of specific defense activities on the 
floor of the deep ocean is not possible 
in an unclassified paper. Nor is such a 
detailed, specific discussion necessary in 
order to determine the scope and nature 
of the U.S. national security interest in 
the ocean floor. Officials of the Depart-
ment of Defense and Department of the 
Navy have spoken publicly about tlus 
interest and have sketehed the key 
elements in unclassified form. Several of 
these statements are listed in the bib-
liography. Perhaps the most compre-
hensive and frank public discussion of 
the defense interests occurred in an 
address by Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Robert A. Frosch on October 7, 
1967.25 He listed the following as the 
more significant defense interests: 
(1) Sea basing of strategic deterrent: 
Future design of sea based deterrents 
following POLARIS/POSEIDON may 
take many forms. Underwater silos, for 
example, are a possibility. Should that 
be so, it may be that the maritime 
nuclear powers would like to keep the 
continental shelves and deep ocean 
available for some use by such military 
systems. This, however, would not 
necessarily be a bar to use of these 
areas of the ocean bottom also for 
exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources.26 
(2) Warning and surveillance sys-
tems: The rules for military use of the 
sea should not forbid installations on 
the ocean bottom for tlle detection of 
submarines. ... The rules should not 
deny freedom of tllC seas for deploy-
ment of strategic detection and warn· 
ing devices.27 
(3) Other units deployed on the $('a 
floor: Tlw furtlll'r extension of mili-
tary capabilities to thl' seabl'd is a clt-ar 
possibility .... The right to deploy 
units on the sea floor in intcmational 
waters for the purpose of inspecting 
for mines or other irnpediments to the 
legitimate exercise of the freedom of 
tlle seas in particular seems useful.28 
(4) Protection of nationals engaged 
in sea floor activities: One other mili. 
tary possibility to be noted specifically 
is protection of those engaged in ex-
ploitation of the sea. United States 
capital is unlikely to be risked unless it 
is United States policy to protect the 
investments against foreign or piratical 
invasions. Tills will be a Navy and/or 
Coast Guard mission.29 
Summarizing, Dr. Frosch stated: 
From the standpoint of the United 
States military capabilities, it would 
appear to be generally advantageous if 
claims of the seabed were limited to 
exploration and exploitation. The right 
of military surveillance could be en· 
dangered by permitting establishment 
of sovereignty or control jurisdiction, 
either by nations or international 
bodies, over tlle sea bottom. 
It is militarily desirable to: (l) mini-
mize any extension of territorial seas; 
(2) closely limit sovereignty over the 
continental shelves; and (3) maintain 
freedom of the air space above the high 
seas.30 
Thus, the United Slall's hm; l\ vilal 
interest in preserving the right to utilize 
the seabed of the deep oeean for de-
fense activities. Such defense activities 
would bc favored by a regime of free-
dorn--onc in which eaeh nation would 
be free to carry out legitimate defense 
activities on the sea bottom beyond the 
continental shelf but without any exclu-
sive appropriation of the sea bottom or 
a portion thereof solely for the benefit 
of one nation. 
Other Activities. Although some of 
the more ardent proponents of in-
creased exploration and exploitation of 
the ocean visualize usc of the sculled for 
such activitics as vacation resorts, colo· 
nics [or semipermancnt residence of 
sl'i('nlisls, eu~inl'er:;. and llilwr IIndt'r· 
Wall'f \\'Orkt'f:; in tWt';1I\ i!ltln:;lrit':\ (t'.I-(., 
mining), and even us sites for largl', 
(lOlliI'd permanent eiLies,31 these uses 
arc so far in the future that considera-
tion of a legal regime applicable to such 
activitics would seem to be pure specu-
lation at this time. Even as to activities 
within the realm of early realization 
many uncertainties exist, making it dif-
ficult to visualize specific legal problems 
that may be faced. Only experience 
with the management of activities in the 
ncar future can provide a foundation 
upon which the principles for manage-
ment of later, more comprehensive 
activities may be built. Thus, those "far 
out" activities wiII be considered in the 
later discussion only to the extent that 
actions taken now might prejudice later 
logical development of a regime to 
embrace them. 
Summary. The foregoing survey of 
activities that are most likcly to take 
place on the seabed within the foresee-
able future suggests that for explora-
tion, research, and defense activities, the 
basic principle of a regime which would 
favor such activities would be one of 
freedom, i.e., a shared or "inclusive" 
right to carry them out without hin-
drance, but also without excluding 
others frolll the same right. The disposal 
of radioactive wastes would likewise call 
for this type of regime. On the other 
hand, the exploitation of the resources 
of the seabed and suhsoil would seem to 
be beller served by the principle of 
exclusivity, i.e., a right to appropriate 
the resources of a particular area, at 
least for a specified period of time, 
solely for the benefit of the exploiter 
and to the exclusion of others. 
It is now possible to proceed to an 
examination of the types of regimes 
which have been suggested for the sea-
bed and subsoil of the deep ocean to 
determine how they fit the criteria 
derived above. 
IV-ALTERNATIVE REGIMES 
FOR THE SEABED 
Possible Alternatives. Legal regimes 
which have already been suggested for 
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the seabed beyond the limits of the 
continental shelf include confirming the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state to the 
midpoint of the ocean, and establishing 
ownership in the United Nations. Tradi-
tional principles of international law 
suggest two additional ones, in particu-
lar: (1) consideration of the seabed as 
res nullius, that is, the property of no 
one and thus subject to appropriation 
by states under traditional principles of 
international law, and (2) consideration 
of the seabed as res communis, that is, 
the property of the world community 
and therefore not subject to the estab-
lishment of a national jurisdiction over 
it (but, as is accepted for fish in the high 
seas, subject to harvesting by all). This 
Chapter is devoted to an analysis of 
these four possible regimes. 
Res Nullius. In customary interna-
tional law the term res nullius or terra 
nullius refers to territory which, al-
though capable of being acquired, has 
not yet been acquired by any sover-
eign.l The high seas themselves have 
long been considered as being res com-
munis and not capable of appropriation 
by any state.2 This principle was con-
firmed by the High Seas Convention 
adopted at Geneva in 1958.3 The fact 
that superjacent waters are not subject 
to appropriatioll, howevcr, Ih)(~t! 1I0t 
nccessarily mean that the seabed has the 
same status.4 In the 19th century even 
so great a champion of the freedom of 
the seas as England claimed ownership 
of the pearl fishing beds under the high 
seas off the coasts of Ceylon and Bah-
rein on the grounds of uninterrupted 
and undisputed proprietorship of suc-
cessive rulers since time immemorial.5 
The Bey of Tunis, during the same 
period, claimed sponge beds under cer-
tain areas of the high seas.6 
The Continental Shelf Convention 
provides ample evidence that the status 
of the seabed can be separated juridi-
cally from the status of the superjacent 
waters. That Convention clearly spells 
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out that the status of the waters above 
the Continental Shelf as high seas is not 
affected by the coastal state's jurisdic-
tion over the seahed and subsoi1.7 Thus, 
there would appear to be no legal 
incongruity in separate legal statuses for 
the seabed and superjacent waters. 
If we assume that the seabed beyond 
the continental shelf could be con-
sidered as res llUlliILS, it is necessary to 
determine what would be the means by 
which a nation would acquire jurisdie-
tion, and what would be the advantages 
to the Unitell States and to the world 
cOJlllllunity if this status were estab-
lished. 
The method traditionally recognized 
as vesting sovereignty8 to territory 
which is res lIullius is occupaLion. 
Aequisition of sovercignty by occupa-
tion requires, first, intentional appro-
priation of territory not already under 
the sovereignty of any other state;9 and 
second, "effective occupation." 
In modern international law, "effec-
tive occupation" is a tcrm not neces-
sadly denoting physical settlement but 
rather meaning the actual, continuous 
and peaceful exercisc of the functions 
of a statc in rclation to the territory. 
Professor C.ll.M. Waldock, in a dcfini-
tive examination of the most recent 
World \.ourt cases on the suhject, has 
concluded that till: L wo csscntial de-
ments are (I) the intcntion and will to 
act as sovercign and (2) some actual 
exercise or display' of sovereignty. Thc 
second of these clements, in turn, eon-
sists of four clements which additi.onally 
go to prove the first. These are that the 
cxercise of sovcreignty must be: 
(1) Pcaccful--Le., not contested from 
the bcginning by competing acts of 
sovercignty. 
(2) Actual--i.c .• not a mere prrtense. 
It IllIH~t include ads whieh :Ire ,·iL her a 
gl'nuine l:xcrcise of Ilolllcstic jurit'die-
tion or an intcrnational dcaling, as hy 
trcaty. 
(3) Sufficient to confer a valid Litle 
to sovereignty-i.e., sufficient undcr the 
circumstanccs of the particular terri-
tory. In sparsely inhahited or uninhahit-
able territory, the occupying staLe may 
not be required to maintain even a 
single official permanently on the spot. 
(4) Continuous--this, like thc degree 
of sufficiency, depends on thc circum-
stances.lO 
Several noted intcrnational lawycrs, 
during the formative period of Lhc 
contincntal shclf doctrine, gave con-
sidcration to thc theory of occupatiou 
as a mcans for thc establishmcnt of 
national claims to the seabed. Professor 
Waldock was one of those who favored 
the doctrinc as u po::,..;ihle hasis for sudl 
claims. llc argued that thc rcccnt itlLcr-
national court cases had negated the 
requirement that actual settlement or 
exploitation is a sine qua non of effec-
tive occupation. In his view: 
Occupation, in the modem law is 
the assumption of sovereignty ratlll'r 
than tile appropriation of property and 
tllcse three cases [Islantl of ['almas, 
Ens/em Greenland. and CliPIIC'rlon 
Islantl] lay down clearly that what is 
rcquired is effcctivc display of state 
activity in such a manncr as thc cir-
cumstances of tile territory dcmand. 
No doubt, an international tribunal 
will still seek 10 dislin/.,'1lish hrlwC'r.n a 
~"nuilw, ,'ffecliv(~ manifestation "f 
slale functions and a Jlurely paJler 
claim but in dcsolatr, or, in the case of 
thc sea-bed, submergcd territory, it wiII 
only dcmand the minimum state ac-
tivity, which the nature of the territory 
calIs for. On this basis, cffeetive as-
sumption of jurisdiction over fairly 
cxtcnsive areas of sea-bed can probably 
be establish cd witllOUt nccessarily 
showing much or even anr physical 
activity on tile sea-bed itself. 1 
But Waldock ha$tl'I\I~11 to add that 
proximity or contiguity is also an 
imp orLan t fucLor in establishing the 
vali,lilv of :;llI'h dailll:;.12 
.I \l(i~l' l.auLl'rpacht arglwd fur a JllOI'I! 
stringcnt tcst: 
'1'0 speak of occupation of submarine 
areas is to usc language even more 
unreal than that refl'rrillg to occupa-
tion, as a basis of territorial title, of 
arctic and antarctic regions. States have 
indeed put fonvard c1aims--not al-
togcther uncontrovcrted-to the latter, 
but they havc not bascd them on any 
principlc gcrmane to occupation, effec-
tive or fictitious. 
.•. As no cffeetive acts of occupa-
tion (in the ordinary scnse of the 
word), eoncurrcntlr with the act of 
proclamation of title or at any ascer-
tainable period in the foreseeable 
future, arc possihle in rclation to con-
tiguous suhmarine areas, it is found 
ncccssary to faU back upon tIle barest 
minimum of occupation which reduces 
occupation to a shadow of its natural 
meaning, namely, to a proclamation 
and, possibly, the granting of con-
cessions. 1 3 
.J udgc l.nuLcrpachL wcnt 011 to say 
Lhat "cffccLivcncss" supported hy COIl-
tiguity was thc tcst. IIc Lhcn statcd: 
lIut cffectivcness is not a magic formu-
la which can be applied with mathe-
matical prceision. It is effectiveness 
relativc to the situation and the eir-
eUlllstanec~. It may range frOl1l tlle 
requirl'lllcnt of intcnsive administra-
tion in cverr 'nook and comer' in a 
dcnsely populatcd and developed arca 
to mcrc 'statl! activity' manifesting 
itsl-If in thc conclusion of treatiee and 
confermcnt of concessions by an 
authoritr situated in a narrowly cir-
cumscrihed part of tllC territory or 
evcn ou tsidc it; alHl it may assume thc 
forlll of a merc proclamation .... As 
already SU!!gcstcd thc conc(!ptions of 
cffeetivI! occupation and contiguity, 
bcillg fI-lative, arc but a starting point. 
It is within thc Icgitimate province of 
thc judicial function-and of statcs-
manship-to usc thcm with such discre-
tion as thc equitics of thc easc and 
considcrations of stability require.14 
Professor ltichard Young, on the 
othcr hand, r~jcctcrl the doctrinc of 
occupation cntirely, stating that it: 
•.. reintroduces into intcmationallaw 
the idca of fictitious occupation as a 
v.did basis of title. That concept, found 
by cxpl'ricllce to he a fertile breeder of 
eontroversr, has hecn largely rcjeeted 
in modem times, save pcrhaps for the 
polar areas. The wisdom of readmitting 
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it willi respcet to submarine areas is at 
least questionable. To insist that 
occupation is necessary undcr a gencral 
rule, and then to admit a spurious 
occupation as sufficient, is dcvious 
reasoning. Thc necessity of a fiction 
strongly suggests that tIlC problcm is in 
the wrong pigconhole, and that claims 
to submarinc areas require different 
treatmcnt from claims to land terri-
tory.l5 
As wiII he recallcd, thc contincntal 
shdf has hccn placed in a differcnt 
"pigconholc"--onc hased on thc dcpth 
of thc supeljaecnt watcr and adjaccncy 
to thc claiming sLate. For submarinc 
areas beyond Lhc continental shclf, how-
ever, thcrc is no convenient "pigeon-
holc" rcad ily availahlc for disposal of 
thc vast areas of the scab cd. Occupa-
tion, dcspite its fictitious character, has 
ccrtain c1cmcnts to commend it for 
consirlcration. Thc forcmost of these is 
that dcspitc uncertainties and ambigui-
ties in thc docLrinc, it does prescribe 
certain minimal criteria which appcar to 
hc gcncrally acccpLcd. The idca of effcc-
tive occupation of thc arca claimed 
would certainly servc as a damper on 
broad, exclusive national c1aillls. Even in 
the inho:;piLahlc environllIent of the 
decp seabed, sOllie aeLiviLies hrrcatcr than 
mcre proclamations would be, requircd 
to meet the tcst. Th us, perhaps the 
hroad, sweeping unilateral claims which 
marked thc history of naLional terri-
torial sea claims could hc avoidcd. 
On the oLher hand. as Young has 
pointed out, thc doctrine has been u a 
fertilc hrccdcr of controvcrsy. "16 Tying 
an ambiguous concept to an arca of the 
earth which is largely unexplored and 
uncxploited. and apparently for SOIllC 
timc yet unexploiLable in a mcaningful 
scnsc, would eertainly hreed additional 
controversy. Not only is it unccrtain as 
to what typcs of activities would he 
surficientto eonsLitute cffective occupa-
tion. bllt also th(' physical charactcr-
istics of tIll' sea do not s\lg~cst any 
readily idcnlifiahlr' nwans of rleter-
mining thc boundaries of an arca which 
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might be occupied.l 7 
From the standpoint of the United 
States interests, application of the doc-
trine of occupation to the seabed would 
probably be a net advantage. Within the 
foreseeable future only a few of the 
more highly developed, technologically 
advanced nations would be in a position 
to make claims under this doctrine. 
Despite a relatively late start in the 
field, the United States is now well 
ahead in the undersea technology race. 
Dr. Edward Wenk, Executive Secretary 
of the National Council on Marine 
Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment, recently stated that the United 
States has a 5 to 1 edge over all other 
nations combined in its ability to probe 
the untapped wealth of the oceans.1 8 
Furthermore, the technological inability 
of other states to assert valid claims to 
areas of the deep ocean bed would 
preserve to the United States (at least 
for a time) the right of inclusive use of 
the seabed for the continuation of its 
rescarch and exploratory work, radio-
activc waste disposal, and defense activi-
ties in unclaimed areas. 
The very properties which would 
appear to make adoption of the occupa-
tion theory of advantage to the United 
States (and by the same reasoning to 
other technologically advanced nations 
such as the United Kingdom, lISSIt, 
France, and Japan) would probably 
make it unacceptable to the less ad-
vanced states. Their lack of technologi-
cal capability would permanently freeze 
them out of any access to the resources 
of the deep ocean, for presumably as 
their technology and financial resources 
would increase, so too would those of 
the advanced nations, thus leaving the 
backward states with only the "left-
overs" for their occupation and claim. 
Fear of this·-and the desire that future 
exploitation of thc seabed should pri-
marily hem'fit tl1l' (It'v('lopin~ nation:>--
pervaded till' slah'menls of lIIany of t h(' 
smaller nations during the debate on the 
Malta resolution at the Twenty-second 
Session of the United Nations General 
Assemhly.1 9 
Thus, although adoption of a regime 
based on the res nullius doctrine would 
appear to have certain favorable features 
from the standpoint of the United 
States, its acceptability to the less de-
veloped states would appear to be 
highly questionable. 
Res Communis. The high seas are 
open to all nations and no state may 
validly purport to subject any part of 
them to its sovereignty.20 Article 2 of 
the High Seas Convention lists four 
specific freedoms which are included 
within the doctrine of freedom of the 
high seas, but, in prefacing the listing by 
the term inter alia, it indicates that the 
list does not exhaust the types of 
activities which nations are free to 
conduct on the high seas.21 Included 
among the additional types of activities 
are naval exercises, including gunfire, 
torpedo, and bombing practices; weap-
ons testing; wastc disposal; and rescarch 
and exploration.22 All activities on thc 
high scas are governed by the general 
prescription of Article 2 that: 
These freedoms, and others which 
arc recognized by the general principles 
of international law, shall be exercised 
by all States with reasonable regard to 
the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the fre(~dolll of the hi~h 
seas. 
The device which has insured respect 
for the rights of others in an area not 
subject to the jurisdiction of any state is 
the doctrine of nationality of ships. This 
doctrine requires that a ship be regis-
tered in some state as a prerequisite to 
its right to sail on the high seas. The 
state of registry-the flag state--in turn is 
required to exercise its jurisdiction over 
the ship and crew to insure their com-
pliance with the international law of the 
hi~h seas.23 On the high seas, thl~ 
jnri~(lil'li()n of the fl:,~ :ltah~ ig ('x-
dllsiVl'.2·~ 
The freedom of the high seas for the 
lawful use of all nations (but for 
appropriatioJl by nonc) has given risc to 
the use of the term res omnium com-
mlwis or res communis, that is, belong-
ing to all states equally, as being descrip-
tive of the legal status of the high seas. 
Although the description is not pre-
cisely accurate, it will be used in the 
remainder of this paper as a shorthand 
means of referring to the principles of 
freedom applicable to the high seas. 
Neither the phrase res commlwis nor 
the doctrine of freedom means, however, 
that the resources of the sea cannot be 
appropriated by a state or its nationals. 
The right to take fish from the high seas 
provides the elearest, and most firmly 
established, example that the seas' 
resources can be appropriated. What the 
doe trine does mean is that no state can 
appropriate an area of the high scas for 
exploitation solely by its nationals. The 
distinction between a status of res nul-
lius and res communis is that in the case 
of the former, certain aets may vest title 
to a particular territory or area in a 
sovereign; in the latter, title to resources 
vests upon their reduction to possession. 
Since fish and other resources of the 
high seas are currently harvested in this 
manner, obviously the same theory pro-
vides one possible regime for the seabed 
beyond the continental shelf. 
The theory behind such a regime 
would be that the seabed and suhsoil of 
the deep oceans, and the resources 
thereof, are a "free good," like the air 
we breathe or the fish of the high seas. 
The basis for such a theory is the 
inexhaustibility of the resource. If the 
resources are indeed inexhaustible, then 
there is no need for exclusive rights. 
McDougal and Burke have stated the 
case for such a theory thus: 
This inclusive aeccss to, and enjoyment 
of, the oceans has encouraged the 
diffcrcnt communities and pcoplcs to 
bring thrir particular talents and re-
sourccs to bear upon the production 
and sharing of the benefits from the 
oceans and has, thus, greatly enhanced 
the aggregate base values available to, 
and employed by, the general com-
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lIIunity for su('h Jlurposcs .... the 
vastness and the immense riches of the 
oceans have ..• facilitated the develop-
mcnt in high degree of joint, non-
competitive and cooperative, strategies, 
characterized by a minimum of mutual 
interference and deprivation. The out-
comes of this inclusive, cooperative 
enjoyment of the oceans, as demon-
strated in recent centuries, have been 
genuinely integrative-with all peoples 
gaining and none losing--in an enor-
mous production of goods and services 
for all mankind.25 
Not everyone is as sanguine as Mc-
Dougal and Burke as to the results of 
uncontrolled, shared use of the seas. 
The long list of depleted stocks of fish 
provides ample evidence that at least the 
living resources of the sea are not 
inexhaustible.26 Examples from non sea 
areas would also suggest that the un-
regulated use of resources leads to waste 
and in some cases exhaustion. For 
example, until the first quarter of the 
present century, western grazing lands 
were treated as common property re-
sources, a treatment that was initially 
established because it was believed they 
were inexhaustible.27 Similarly, un--
regulated exploitation of pctrolcum 
resources in thc early stages of large-
scale usc of that resourcc resulted in 
highly wastcful practices.28 And evcry 
American schoolchild lcarns of thc cx-
tinction of thc passenger pigeoJl and 
near cxtermination of the buffalo by 
uncontrolled hunting. 
But even assuming inexhaustibility of 
resources, there is another problem with 
respect to a regime of freedom of 
exploitation of the seabed. The key 
element of a regime which would favor 
exploitation of the resources would be 
assurance that the entrepreneur would 
have sufficient exclusivity so that he 
would have a reasonable opportunity to 
recover the costs of his investment and 
makc a pro fit. If thc mincral rcsollr<:cs 
lire rcally so Vllst ;IS to make room for 
all, thcir commercial value varics with 
the composition and concentration of 
nodules, their depth, and the proximity 
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to operating bases and markels.29 Thus, 
there would be competition to harvest 
or exploit those of the greatest cco-
nomic value. The concentration of the 
fishing fleets of many nations in the 
areas of richest catches, such as the 
Grand Banks of Newfoundland and the 
waters around Iceland, provides an 
example of the natural consequences of 
such a regime. 
While the process of accommodation 
could work for fisheries, there is prob-
ably less chance that it would for 
exploitation of seabed resources. Thc 
economics of the two situations arc 
quite different. Calculations based on 
IVlero's studies of manganese nodule 
deposits have indicated that an entrepre-
neur would probably require exclusive 
rights to an area of at least 1,000 square 
miles to make exploitation of manga-
nese nodules economically feasible.30 
Mining or drilling into the subsoil would 
be even more expensive, with an even 
greater requirement for exclusivity to 
make the venture potentially profitable. 
The foregoing discussion of the res 
communis theory has concentrated on 
the resource exploitation aspect of the 
problem because that would be the 
activity most affected by adoption of 
such a regime for the seabed and sub-
soil. If this theory were adopted, other 
activities on the seabed could be carried 
out in the same manne;:- as they are 
carried out on the high seas today. Each 
nation and its nationals would be free to 
conduct lawful activities, subject only 
to the laws of the "flag state" and to 
the rights of others likewise engaged In 
lawful projects.31 These activities--
research and exploration, fishing, waste 
disposal, defense activities, etc.--are in-
clusive rather than exclusive in nature. 
They are, additionally, the types of 
activities that states have traditionally 
carried out on the high scas without the 
nl'l'l'~.;it\" of a nation:l[ or inll'rnat iona[ 
juri$lliciinn owr thl' arl'a in whil'h t[lI')' 
arc conducted. Controversies anll com-
peting uses have been worked out 
through :111 acco\lllllod:ltivl~ pmceHH 
which, although far frolll perfect, has 
generally kept the high seas free for the 
lawful usc of all. Thus, activities othcr 
than resource exploitation would appear 
to be favored by a res communis regime 
for the seabed. 
If, however, the exploitation of the 
seabed's resources should hecOlne the 
dominant activity, interaction bctwcen 
such exploitation and the other activi-
ties might have' adverse effects on the 
latter. For example, drags, dredges, drill 
rigs, and the like might have an adverse 
effecL on the lise of the sallle area of the 
seabed for defense activities or rescarch 
activities, or might require restrictions 
on the usc of the high scas themselves to 
protect the sea bottom activity. Wheth-
er mutual accommodation could occllr 
in such circumstances is conjcctural. 
Obviously, in the absence of some au-
thority over the area--either national or 
international--failure of accommodation 
is a distinct possibility. 
A res communis regime would appear 
to be advantageous to the United States 
from several standpoints. Probably the 
foremost is that aetivitil's conducted by 
other states, no matter how extensive or 
long continued, would not lead to the 
establishment of claims to jurisdiction 
by slIch statcs. Thus, the right of the 
United Statcs to continucu IIHe of the 
seabed for a wide range of current 
activities would be protected. Addition-
ally, as the leader in underwater tech-
nology, the United States has a valid 
interest in preserving the availability of 
the maximum area of sea bottom for 
future exploitation by its nationals. A 
regime which would prevent the asser-
tion of national claims would obviously 
serve this end. Once commercial exploi-
tation of the mineral resources of the 
sea bottom begins, however, a regime 
which would not protect the first entre-
pn'lu'ur in :til IIfl'a al-(ain:;[ "l'Iailll 
jUlIIlll'rs" would rrl'alt' Iilllt' it\(~I'ntiw 
for imaginative and risky ventures. 
From an international viewpoint, a 
regime based on the res communis 
theory would probably have little at-
traction, particularly to the less-devel-
oped nations of the world. Just as in the 
res nullius concept all of the benefits 
derived from exploitation of the seabed 
would flow to the technologically ad-
vanced states. The less-developed states 
would receive little or no benefit from 
it. Thus, this theory would probably be 
unacceptable to such states. 
Coastal State Jurisdiction. Under the 
present state of the law, the sea's 
bottom beyond the limit of the conti-
nental shelf is not subject to the claim 
of any state. However, a scheme which 
would vest jurisdiction in the coastal 
state is one of the possible regimes 
which merits consideration in any 
examination of alternative regimes. 
Coastal state jurisdiction has con-
sidcrable appeal. The exploitability cri-
terion of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion provides its natural basis. If it is 
assumed that the exploitability criterion 
could be extended outward beyond the 
limit of the continental shelf, it would 
follow, by analogy to Artiele 1 of the 
Contineutal Shelf Convention,32 that as 
any coastal state acquired the capahility 
to exploit to a greater depth, all coastal 
claims would be extended outward to 
equal depth.33 Assuming the eventual 
capability of exploitation of even the 
deepest ocean floor, the final result 
would be that the entire ocean bed 
would belong to the coastal states of the 
world. 
Undcr the foregoing theory, the 
claims of opposite coastal states would 
eventually meet, which raises the ques-
tion where the boundary between them 
would lie. Article 6 of the Continental 
Shelf Convention provides the answer: 
1. Whcre the same eontincntal shclf 
is adjaccnt to the territories of two or 
more Slates whosc coasts arc opposite 
('aeh other. the boundary of th(' conti-
nental shelf appertaining to such States 
shall be dctcrmillcd by agreement be-
tween them. In the absence of agree-
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menl, and unlcss anothcr boundary is 
justified by spccial circumstances, the 
boundary is the median linc, evcry 
point of whieh is equidistant from the 
nearest points of the basclines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea 
of each State is measured. 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article pre-
scribes an identical formula for estab-
lishing the boundary between adjacent 
states. 
The principal advantage of such a 
regime would be its simplicity. Al-
though there might be some prohlems in 
detcrmining exactly what is mcant hy 
exploitability,34 the delincation and 
administration of national claims under 
this theory would be relatively simple 
compared to the othcr regimes ex-
amined. Demarcation of outer boun-
daries would follow the isobath and 
could easily be drawn on hydrographic 
charts. If technology does eventually 
permit exploitation to the deepest parts, 
the equidistance principle provides a 
workable mechanical method of draw-
ing boundaries in the absence of an 
agreement. 
An appreciation of the result of a 
coastal statc rcgime with boundaries 
delineated in accordance with the fore-
going principles can be gained by 
cxamining Figure 2, which is a chart of 
a portion of the North Atlantic Ocean 
showing national seabed boundaries 
extended to their maximum limits and 
drawn in accordance with the equi-
distance principle. What immediately 
strikes the observer is the predominant 
role playcd by islands. Under thc Conti-
ncntal Shclf Convention, islands have 
the same basis for claims to the seabed 
and subsoil as do continental mainlands. 
Although not shown in Figure 2, even 
such insignificant dots as Clipperton 
Island, Asccnsion Island, St. Helena 
Island, Tristan de Cunha and South 
(;('or~ia would serv,' as hast's for lar~c 
national claims. The United States 
would be able to claim vast areas of the 
Pacific because of the location of the 
oj:::o. 
~ 
Figure 2.--North Atlantic Ocean with Seabed Boundaries Based on Equidistance Principle 
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Hawaiian Islands. In the Atlantic, how-
ever, foreign offshore islands would be a 
barrier to very extensive claims. 
A regime which divided up the 
seabeds according to this system would 
probably be conducive to maximum 
exploration and exploitation of the 
natural resources of the seabed. Each 
coastal state could grant the exclusive 
rights which have been found to be a 
necessary precondition to commercial 
ventures for mining of the seabed. If the 
coastal state did not care to exploit the 
seabed itself-or did not have the tech-
nological capability-it could license 
foreign companies and extract a royalty 
income. The promise of a monetary 
return to the licensing state would 
probably serve as the necessary spur to 
encourage rapid development of under-
sea resources. 
Other types of activities on the sea-
bed, however, might be severely ham-
pered. As Dr. Wilbert Chapman has 
pointed out, assertions of special pur-
pose jurisdictions by coastal states over 
areas of the high seas tend to ripen into 
general jurisdictions.35 The history of 
the continental shelf claims by other 
states following the Truman Proclama-
tion in 1945 illustrates this phe-
nomenon. Although the Truman Procla-
mation asserted only a special purpose 
jurisdiction for the purpose of exploit-
ing the natural resources of the shelf, 
the claims asserted by a number of 
other states were not so narrowly de-
fined. In some cases they were all 
inclusive, asserting full sovereignty over 
the seabed, the superjacent waters, and 
the airspace above them.36 Thus, a 
major drawback of a coastal state re-
gime over the deep ocean floor would 
be the possible creation of a con-
glomeration of "national lakes" in 
which the traditional freedom of the 
high seas would have shrunk to only a 
shadow of its fonner sclf. 
A second drawback would be the 
probable opposition of the U.S.S.R. The 
coastal state approach would provide 
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practically no gains to the U.S.S.R. 
other than a small portion of the North-
west Pacific and the Barents and Arctic 
Oceans. It seems unreasonable to expect 
that the Soviet Union would agree to a 
regime in which it gained so little and 
others gained so much. Without the 
agreement of the Soviet Union, it does 
not seem possible that a viable regime 
would result. 
Finally, because the results of the 
coastal state regime are so uneven in the 
distribution of benefits, it appears un-
likely that it could receive anything 
approaching a consensus in the world 
community. Inland states, of course, 
would receive no benefits. States with 
only short coastlines, or whose coast-
lines are of a concave configuration, 
would generally receive little. Islands 
would be the big gainers, and in many 
cases they are not at all well situated, 
politically, economically, or technologi-
cally, to do the best job of exploiting 
the undersea resources. 
In sum, therefore, although coastal 
state jurisdiction has a considerable 
superficial attraction, it has a number of 
drawbacks which make its adoption as a 
regime for the deep ocean bed lcss than 
ideal. 
International J urisdietion. Sugges-
tions for the establishment of an inter-
national regime for thc deep ocean bcd 
have come from a number of sourccs-
privatc individuals,37 study groups and 
commissions,38 government officials,39 
and governments themselves.40 Such 
suggestions have varied in their details 
but have generally included the follow-
ing core elements: 
(1) Vesting of jurisdiction over the 
seabed and subsoil beyond the edge of 
the continental shelf in the United 
Nations or in a special international 
agency; 
(2) Establishment of the principle 
that the seabed and subsoil beyond the 
continental shelf are not subject to 
appropriation by any state; 
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(3) Leasing or licensing of private 
exploitation of the resources of the 
seabed and subsoil by the international 
agency; and 
(4) In several proposals, reservation 
of the seabed solely for peaceful pur-
poses. 
The discussion of methods for bring-
ing such arrangements into being is 
reserved for Chapter V. The discussion 
in this section considers the advantages 
and disadvantages that might be antici-
patcd from such a regime. 
The Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, the rescarch af-
filiate of the United Nations Association 
of the United States, which is one of the 
proponents of an international jurisdic-
tion for the ocean's floor, lists six 
principal advantages which it says will 
flow from such a regime. They are: 
(I) I t would avoid controversy 
among nations arising from conflicting 
claims to, and appropriative uses of, the 
uncommitted areas of the earth; 
(2) It would insure the economically 
most effective use of the natural re-
sources of the sea; 
(3) It would prevent military use of 
the seabed; 
(4) It would avoid contamination of 
the seas; 
(5) It would insure that all nations 
would profit by the opportunities and 
potential resources; and 
(6) It would provide the United Na-
tions with an independent source of 
income (from licensing and registration 
fees).41 
The foregoing list of advantagcs 
sccms to include all of the important 
ones claimcd by thc other proponents 
of an international rr~inll'. Thc t'mpha· 
sis /-,rivcn to one or anot her ha$ vllrird 
considerably, however. The propo$al of 
Malta at the 22nd session of the General 
Assemhly put primary emphasis on the 
nccessity of prevcnting the uLilization of 
the seabed for military purposes and on 
the henefit which the United Nations 
would derive from the income received, 
which, in turn, could be used for the 
benefit of the developing nations.42 
Senator Pell gives primacy to the need 
to provide for order to foster rapid 
technological breakthrough which he 
believes is imminent.43 Quincy Wright 
assigns equal weight to the promotion 
of world peace, efficient exploitation, 
and equitable opportunity among 
nations.44 
The resolution of the Government of 
l\lalta at the 22nd General Assembly 
provoked a flurry of interest in the U.S. 
Congress in the fall of 1967. Fifteen 
resolutions were introduced in the 
House of Representatives in opposition 
to vesting title to the ocean floor in the 
United Nations.45 In the Senate three 
resolutions were introduced, one oppos-
ing an international regime and two 
favoring it.46 Committees in both 
Houses have held hearings on the sub-
ject, at which the proponents and 
opponents were heard. The primary 
objection of the opponents was not 
substantive but procedural. Both 
governmental and nongovernmental 
witnesses asserted that knowledge about 
the ocean depths was at present too 
primitive lind incompletc to I'crlllillld-
vocacy of any substantive rcgime for the 
deep ocean bed. The spokcsman for the 
Department of State, for example, 
stated: 
All of us in a sense arc groping in an 
area in which not much has becn donc. 
We are certainly unclear as to the 
possibilitics economically. We surcly 
don't know as yet preeiscly what the 
security implications are. There is so 
much work to bc done that it would 
clearly bc a mistake to procccd to 
devclop conclusions at this time.47 
Tht' ,\$$it;tllnt Sl'l'rt'l:lry of Intl'rior 
~taled thc position of hi$ I )l'plIl'lnlC'nl 
thus: 
Thc Dcpartmcnt recognizes that the 
United Nations is a ~'Iilable forum for 
development of international law for 
use of the oceans' resources. We believe 
that in the present state of our knowl-
edge of the resource of the deep-sea 
bed and the problems that may be 
involved it is premature to consider 
international control over these re-
sources, and for that reason we do not 
support the treaty as proposed by 
Malta.48 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
representing the Department of De-
fense, staled: 
.•• it is much too early in our knowl-
edge and understanding of the nature 
of deep ocean resources allli of the 
technology that will be required to 
exploit them for us to consider major 
legal questions regarding its exploita-
tion and ownership, certainly too early 
for us to think that we would know 
what we were doing if we were to take 
action to vest control of ocean re-
sources in an international body in a 
specific way.49 
The representatives of the Executive 
Braneh of the Government, who raised 
objections on the basis of prematurity, 
refused to suggest any alternative re-
gimes which the Government might 
support. Some of the Congressional and 
private witnesses, however, in addition 
to echoing the doubts expressed by 
administration witnesses, did point out 
what they believed were substantive 
objections to an international regime. 
(1) Intcrnationalization of the deep 
ocean bed would amount to a giveaway 
of United States rcsources;50 
(2) Nations are capable of working 
out sharcd use arrangements and resolv-
ing any disagreements by mutual accom-
modation without the necessity of an 
international body assuming jurisdic-
t1on;51 and 
(3) An international administcring 
agency with its attendant bureaucracy 
would retard technological progress in 
exploration and exploitation of thc sea-
bcd.52 
In cxamining thc various claimcd 
advantages and ohjections to an interna-
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tiona! regime, it is important to recog-
nize, first, that the objection of pre-
maturity, which is the one most fre-
quently raised, is not an objection to an 
international regime per se_ Rather, it is 
an expression of a governmental posi-
tion that it is too early for the United 
States to take a firm position on any 
rcgime for the deep seabed. The reason 
it appeared to be an objection to inter-
nationalization was that it was the Malta 
proposal for an international regime 
which occasioned the debate on the 
subject. Thus, insofar as this is an 
objcction to internationalization, it is 
also an objection to any of the alterna-
tive regimes which have been discussed. 
With respect to the advantages 
claimed for an international jurisdiction, 
it is important to recognize that some of 
them presuppose the acceptance by the 
world community of the principles 
advocated. For example, the claim that 
an international regime would prevent 
military use of the seabed assumes 
agreement on making the seabed a 
weapon-free area. Yet, in the U_N. 
debates on the [\lalta resolution, the 
United States and U.S.S.R. indicated 
coolness to this aspect of the proposi-
tion, seemingly expressing a preference 
for treating this aspect within the over-
all framework of disarmament rather 
than in connection with a discussion of 
the oceans.53 It is obvious that any 
regime which did not obtain the con-
currence of these two superpowers 
would be meaningless. 
Apart from this caveat, it should be 
pointed out that an international regime 
does offer genuine advantages. An inter-
national licensing and rulemaking body 
could promote the orderly exploration 
and exploitation of the ocean floor. The 
objection that an international agency 
would be an obstacle to such explora-
tion and exploitation is cOl~ecturaL The 
history of international administration 
in snch fields as dvil aviation, tele-
communications, postal affairs, and 
other functional maLLcrs within the 
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competence of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies is one of generally 
harmonious and fruitful progress. In the 
case of exploitation of seabed resources, 
there would be the added incentive that 
the U.N. agency would be deriving an 
independent income from its grants of 
exploitative rights--an arrangement 
which would be conducive to establish-
ing simple and expeditious procedures 
for granting such rights. 
The idea that an international regime 
would insure that all nations draw bene-
fits may be overoptimistic. Although an 
in~ependent income for the United Na-
tions would be of indirect value to all 
nations, those that would profit most, 
by being involved in the actual exploita-
tive operations, would probably be the 
same nations that would be involved in 
such operations under any possible re-
gime, i.e., those with the technological 
and financial resources to embark on 
the expensive programs involved. Even 
for them, the day when any large-scale 
profits are derived may still be some 
distance into the future. 
As far as U.S. interests are con-
cerned, the allegations that the adoption 
of an international regime would be a 
"giveaway" appear to be overstated. 
Since at the present time no nation has 
a valid claim to the seabed bcyond the 
continental shelf, the United States, in 
agreeing to international jurisdiction 
over the seabed, would not be giving 
away any of its rights. Furthermore, as 
the most advanced nation in undersea 
technology, the United States and its 
citizens would find a leading role in the 
exploitation of the deep ocean under 
any of the alternative regimes. Assuming 
that any jurisdiction vested in an inter-
national body would be no more exten-
sive than that currently exercised by 
coastal states over the continental shelf 
--i.e., sovereib'11 rights to explore and 
exploit the natural resources--activities 
not interfering with exploitative activi-
ties would not be hampered and could 
be carried on by any nation with essen-
tially the same freedom as exists today. 
As a final comment on this rebrime, it 
appears that, despite the apparent un-
willingness of subordinate U.S. officials 
to commit themselves in any specific 
way except that much more work must 
be done before the United States can 
take a position, a 1966 statement by the 
President indicates a marked leaning in 
the direction of an international regime. 
In an address at the commissioning of 
the oceanographic research ship Ocean-
ographer on 13 July 1966, hc stated: 
.•• under no circumstances, we be-
licve, must we ever allow the prospects 
of rich harvest and mineral wealth to 
create a new form of colonial compcti-
tion among the maritime nations. We 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab 
and to hold the lands under the high 
seas. We must ensure that the deep seas 
and the ocean bottoms are, and re-
main, the legacy of all human 
beings.54 
In his statement before the First 
Committee of the General Assembly on 
November 8, 1967, Ambassador Gold-
berg quoted the Prcsident's statement 
alld then addcd: 
This mcans, in our vicw, tha t the 
deep ocean floor should not be a stagc 
for competing claims of national sover-
eignty. Whatever legal regime for the 
usc of thc deep ocean floor lIIay 
eventually be :I/,'Teed upon, it should 
ensure that the decp ocean will be 
open to exploration and use by all 
states, without discrimination.55 
Thus, although only a bare frame-
work has been traced out, the United 
States appears to have committed itself 
to the principle of ruling out purely 
national claims to portions of the sea-
bed. 
Summary. The four bases for a re-
gime of the ocean bottom which have 
been examined do not exhaust all of the 
possihlc bascs for sllch a regimc. An 
entirely novel approach might bc adopt-
ed--or perhaps a composite regime in-
corporating features of one or more of 
the several jurisdictional models dis-
cussed. For example, therc might be a 
possihility of a regime which would 
recognize national claims to the seabed 
but establish an international agency or 
mechanism for recording of claims and 
settlement of disputes. The four re-
gimes, however, embrace the best de-
fined models within the range of pos-
sible jurisdictional arrangements. The 
res nullius and coastal state approaches 
would lead to national jurisdiction over 
segments of the seahed; the interna-
tional approach would lead to an inter-
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national body having jurisdiction of 
sorts; the res communis approach would 
not vest jurisdiction over the seabed per 
se but would lead to control of seabed 
activities by the "flag state" of the 
vessel or structure. By focusing on the 
four approaches it has been possible to 
examine the full range of jurisdictional 
problems in relation to the various 
activities foreseen for the ocean floor_ 
As has been seen, each model has 
certain advantages and is accompanied 
by certain drawbacks. Table I sum-
marizes the results of that examination. 
Table 1.--5ummary of Jurisdictional Model Examination 
(A) 
(B) 
Key: 
Contexts 
Type of activity 
Exploitation of 
natural resources 
Exploration and 
research 
Defense 
activities 
Disposal of 
wastes 
Other Important 
aspects 
Advantage to 
United States 
Advantage to 
U.S.S.R. 
Acceptability to 
developing nations 
Enhancement of 
orderly relations 
between states 
+ = favorable 
- = unfavorable 
Jurisdictional Models 
Coastal 
Res Res State 
Nullius Communis Juris. 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + 
+ + 
? + 
±.b 
7= unknown or conjectural 
Internat. 
Juris. 
+ 
+ 
7a 
7a 
]3 
7a 
+ 
+ 
!!Whether favorable or unfavorable would depend on nature of the 
international regime. 
bprobably acceptable to those with extensive coastlines and to island 
states; probably unacceptable to others. 
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V-ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES 
FOR ESTABLISHING A 
LEGAL REGIME 
Having examined the alternative re-
gimes that might be applied to the 
seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean 
beyond the limits of the continental 
shelf, it is appropriate to examine the 
procedural means by which a regime 
might be brought into being. It will he 
the purpose of this chaper to consider 
several of these procedures, primarily 
from the viewpoint of actions open to 
the United States. 
The procedure which has received 
the most public notice in recent months 
is the negotiation of an international 
multilateral treaty for the ocean floor 
under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. This was the approach suggested 
by the Government of Malta in its 
proposal in the 22nd General Assembly 
of the United Nations. A second ap-
proach might be based on a unilateral 
proclamation by the United States as-
serting a claim to certain rights, in a 
manner similar to the Truman Proclama-
tion on the continental shelf. or pro-
claiming U.S. adhercnce to some otht'r 
principle. A third approach could be 
dubbed the "wait and see" method.! 
Negotiation of an International 
Treaty. I\losL of the sugp;csLions for 
negoLiation of a mulLilateral treaLy Lo 
establish a seabed regime have been 
coupled with the proposal that the 
treaty should also establish the jurisdic-
tion of an international body over the 
seabed and subsoil. The policy of seek-
ing a treaty, however, need not neces-
sarily lead to a parLieular type of 
regime. The Continental Shelf Conven-
tion, which created national jurisdiction 
over portions of the seabed, resulted 
from an international conference. The 
High Seas Convention, which confirmed 
the principle of frerdolll of the hip;h sras 
for the usc of all naLions, n'sulLcd from 
the same international confercnce. As 
will he seen below, however, the mellns 
adopLed for creaLing a legal rcgime Illay 
have some influence on the nature of 
the regime which results. 
The precedenLs mosL frequently ciLed 
for an ocean bed trcaLy are the treaties 
governing Antarctica2 and outer space,3 
particularly the laUer. Those who urge 
early negotiaLions for a treaLy on thc 
ocean bed see an analo!:,'Y between Lhe 
situations which confronted the world's 
decision makers in dealing wiLh the issue 
of compcting claims and uses of ouLcr 
space and Antarctica and what has 
sometimes been callcd "iJllwr space. "·t 
They poinL out thaL by, siLLing down 
togeLher around a confercnce table, Lhe 
nations of the world were able to 
remove these vexing problems from the 
arena of internaLional competition and 
create a basis for peaceful cooperaLion 
among nations. Whether these two 
treaties did, in fact, accomplish as much 
as has been claimed for them is some-
what open to question.? Nevertheless, 
assuming arguendo, that the two treaties 
did settle troublesome problems, the 
situational similariLies between the sea-
bed and these other two environments 
are not necessllriIy so gn'at as to snl!gl':;L 
that the same procedure would he 
cqually applicable to il. Perhaps the 
most significant distinction is the dif-
ference in the world community's per-
cepLion liS Lo tlw vlllue of tlu: sJllIeell 
involved. In the cases of Antarctica and 
ouLer space, only the prospect of gain-
ing scientific knowledge was involved; 
not of that productive use or economic 
gain from their exploitation.6 On the 
other hand, there is a general belief 
among those who advocate negotiation 
of an ocean floor treaty now that there 
are vast riches on the deep ocean floor 
merely waiting for the enterprising 
businessman.7 Although this belief is 
probably greatly overoptimistic (at least 
for the ncar term), it pervades thc 
disl'ussitlll of tl\{\ suhjeet 1II111 provilh,s 
one of the sip;nifit'lllll imp u\s!!s for Lhtl 
drive toward ne~otiaLion. 
A second imporLant distinction is Lhc 
differing knowlcdgc of thc environ-
mcnts involvcd. In comparison to more 
hospitable land areas of the world, 
man's knowledge of the Antarctic is 
limited. Yet many nations have carried 
out extensive exploration and research 
there for several decades,8 apparently of 
sufficient scope and depth to assure the 
nations principally concerned that they 
would not subject their interests to very 
severe risks by putting the issue to an 
international negotiation.9 With respect 
to outer space, despite the fact that 
man's explorations really began only 
about a decade ago, the intensity of the 
effort during that decade has likewise 
created a vast amount of knowledge. In 
addition, during this short period, a 
considcrable hotly of international pre-
eedcnt had already been built up re-
necting the degree of mutual tolerance 
of inclusive uses of space which the 
pr1ndpal powers would accept. U.S. 
Amhassador to the United Nations 
Arthur Goldberg has stated that the 
U.N. sponsored treaty on outer space 
cvolved from a pcrception of common 
interests "_ .. on the basis of ex-
perience ... [which gradually crystal-
lized into binding rules of law. "10 But 
he also suggested that" ... both cOILn-
tries resisted the injection of qILestions 
which, though important and 10brically 
related to the agreed principles, were 
not ripe for international negotia-
tion--such as the delimitation of outer 
space and the exploitation of resources 
on celestial bodies. "11 
In agreement with the testimony of 
U.S. officials in Congressional hearings 
discussed in Chapter IV, the status of 
the deep seabed may be more analogous 
to those issues referred to by Ambas-
sador Goldberg as "not ripe for interna-
tional negotiation" than to those which 
were eovered in the Outer Space Treaty. 
In a more general vein, Ambassador 
Arthur II. Dean, sJleaking from his 
cxpericnce as the chief U.S. ddcgalt~ at 
a number of important international 
confcrences, including the 1958 and 
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jI)()!) lI.N. Law (If thl! Sca Confercnces 
and sevcral years as the chief U.S. 
disarmamcnt negotiator, has stated: 
There is an understandable reluc-
tance on the part of national govern-
ments to enter into agreements with 
other countries binding them irre-
vocably to future action or inaction. 
Circumstances, science, and technology 
change, and nations should not always 
assume obligations into the indefinite 
future for better or for worse. As a 
general rule, therefore, most nations 
prefer to work out ad hoc arrange-
ments with other countries rather than 
to enter into formal agreements which 
may prove unduly restrictive in the 
light of later knowledge. 
This natural inclination to avoid any 
rigid treaty is especially pronounced 
whcn the dimensions of the subject 
matler of a potential trcaty arc rela-
tively unknown and, accordingly, 
where the eventual effect of agreement 
can least be gauged. When the activity 
sought to be regulated by treaty has 
just commenced, so that customs and 
practices with respect to it have not 
crystallized, treaties-which draw much 
of their text and support from customs 
and practice-will seldom be found,12 
All that Ambassadors Goldbcrg and 
Dean hU\'c said applies in full measurc to 
the current state of knowledge of the 
deep seabed. Neverthcless, the pressure 
for some sort of U.N. action was ap-
parently so great at the 221)(1 Gencral 
Assembly that til(! major I)()w(~rs )lUd to 
go at least part way toward meeting this 
dcmand by agreeing to a resolution 
calling for the formation of a 35 nation 
ad hoe committee to study the scope 
and various aspects of the Malta pro-
posal; to undertake a survey of past 
activities of the United Nations and 
other international agencics in the field 
and to prepare an account on all aspects 
of thc question. The ResoluLion also 
called on the ad hoe committee to study 
means for promotion of international 
cooperation and submit a report to the 
2~Jrd session of thc Geneml As-
scm lIly,13 
Thc Resolution passed by the 22nd 
Gcneral Assembly has the familiar ring 
486 
of the early history of U.N. action 
which ultimately led to the adoption of 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1966. Initial 
action within the United Nations on 
that subject was the establishment in 
1958 of an ad hoc committee to study 
the peaceful use of outer space. A year 
later an enlarged Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was 
created. This Committec worked 
through the early sixties with few con-
crete results.14 By 1966, however, 
experience had demonstrated that there 
was an area of common interest be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. which 
could form the basis for an outer space 
treaty.l5 Thus, in 1966-year 9 of the 
space age--upon the initiative of the 
United States and the U.S.S.R., a treaty 
was rapidly negotiated under the aus-
pices of the Committee, resulting in the 
laying of a drl\ft text before the General 
Assembly in December of that year.l 6 
The Treaty was signed by 60 nations at 
a White House ceremony on 27 January 
1967)7 
Although thc United Nations has 
taken only the first tentative step in the 
same direction with respect to thc sea 
floor, it is not inconceivable to visualize 
a similar outcome a few years hence. 
Unilateral Declaration_ The outcomes 
of particular international issues are 
frequently powerfully influenced by the 
initial positions asserted by or on behalf 
of a single prominent state. Grotius' 
freedom of the seas doctrine, which was 
in reality a plea for freedom of naviga-
tion and fishing for Dutch vessels 
against the claims of more powerful 
European nations to exclusive jurisdic-
tion over vast areas of the sea, had a 
marked influence on the development 
of the law of the sea.l8 In more recent 
times, the rapid development of the 
contint'nlal shelf doctrine was, as has 
IWl'n Sl'l'll, llll' tlirl'l'l rt'"u!t of I'rl'Sitll~ul 
Truman's 19·1·;' I'rlldanmlillll. 
Several factors can affect the influ-
ence which a single national statement 
of position can have,. I'rofessor William 
T. Burke has pointed out that the 
timing of a statc's initial claim is often 
as important as its substantive content 
in determining the influence it will have. 
lie suggests that one reason the Truman 
Proclamation had as much influence as 
it did was that it was made at a time 
when the world community was at the 
threshold of activities on the Conti-
nental Shelf. At that time, practices and 
claims inconsistent with the asserted 
U.S. position had not yet had a chance 
to develop. Burke suggests that we arc 
today in essentially the same threshold 
position with respect to the resources of 
the sea floor and that an assertion of 
~ational position by the United States 
would have considerable influence over 
the future development of the law. The 
fact that the U.S. technological lead will 
probably result in U.S. nationals being 
the first to exploit the surficial deposits 
of the seabed will, in his view, enhance 
the influence which the United States 
could exercise by a unilatcral assertion 
of position.l 9 
The substantive position taken by a 
state obviously has an effect on the 
influence which the unilateral assertion 
of position will have. Professor Burke 
points out that claims to exclusive uses 
have gained more general assent than 
have those in which restraint was c:x-
ercised.20 Experience over the past 2 
decades with respect to territorial sea 
claims provides evidence of the trend 
toward broader, exclusive claims. Not 
only have many of the older states 
extended their territorial sea claims to 
12 miles or beyond, but most claims of 
the newly emerging states have been for 
12 miles or beyond.21 The Geographer 
of the State Department, G. Etzel 
Pearcy, has suggested that the basic 
impetus for this trend is nationalism: 
(;mwin~ nalionalisll\ in a world 
rr'l\I~hl wilh IC'II~inIlS OIls" l':IU$l'S lIIallY 
nalillll$ 10 looJ... seawarcl, wi IC' Ii Il'r 
a pprchcnsivc as to securing their do-
main or to extending it. In fact, strong 
nationalism by its very nature serves as 
the ineipicnt forerunner to offshore 
c1aims-.always incrcasing, ncvcr dc· 
creasing. Not uncommonly a statc will 
make greater offshore claims in re· 
sponse to similar claims on the part of 
a neighbo.ring state. 
The emergence of 54 newly inde· 
pendent states since December 1945, 
each with a fresh consciousness as to 
its national domain, has accentuated 
attention given to sovereign territory 
and its bounds.22 
Even where the claim is not for an 
exclusive usc, the advantage of having, 
in effect, preempted the field gives the 
initial claimant an inherent advantage. 
On this point, ProCessor Burke states: 
To be sure, .past experience has been 
that restraint in assertion of claim has 
not prevented others from making 
extravagant demands. Nonethcless, it 
merits emphasis that these demands, 
though still not wholly effectively re· 
futed, have never commanded wide 
assent and, indeed, have been eategori· 
cally rejected by most states. At the 
very least, it seems evident that the 
United States could, by suitably 
limited claim or announccd position, 
promote policics directed at maxi· 
mizing inclusive bcncfit from thc vast 
storehouses of rcsources in and undcr 
the sca.23 
It would appear from the foregoing 
that iC a unilateral proclamation by the 
United States were to have decisive 
influence, it would be important that it 
be made prior to the time that activities 
on the seabed reached such a stage that 
other states fclt that their national 
interests requircd them to assert incon-
sistent national claims. It would appear 
to be particularly important that 
prompt action be taken by the United 
States in the event that the position 
eventually opted for is some sort of 
inclusive regime allowing access by all 
states to the seabed rather than an 
exclusive national claim. As Pearcy has 
aptly put it, offshore cluims, once us-
serted, arc "alwuys incrl~asing, never 
dccreasing." It seenlS evident that had 
the Truman Proclamation in 1945 
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amountcd to a rCllunciation of national 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
rathcr than an assertion oC a claim of 
national jurisdiction, it would not have 
gained the immediate acceptance it did 
reccive. Therefore, the less selfish and 
exclusive the asserted position, the 
greater is the need for early and decisive 
action. 
An obstacle to prompt action by the 
United States is the currently poor 
perception of what type of regime 
would forward national interests in view 
of the lack of knowledge about the sea 
floor environment and its possible fu-
ture uses.24 Intensive study is underway 
within the Government to attempt to 
resolve this matter, and it has been given 
added urgency by the approval of Reso-
lution No. 2340 by the 22nd General 
Assembly.25 But whethcr the study 
results will be available in time to enable 
the United States to take the initiative is 
uncertain. 
The United States appeared to be 
about to take the first step toward a 
unilateral announcement of position in 
1966, when the President spoke at the 
commissioning of the oceano~aphic 
research vessel Oceanographer. 20 That 
statement has not, however, been fol-
lowed up with further action. It may 
have been a trial balloon, although 
Amhassador Goldherg IIuoted it in the 
U.N. debute in the fall of 1967 and 
other U.S. spokesmen have continued to 
repeat it as the current U.S. position.27 
Additionally, it would appear to have 
been watered down by subsequent state-
ments by official U.S. spokesmen who 
have asserted the need for further study 
before the United States can take an 
official position. Thus, although in 1966 
the United States appeared to be on the 
brink of announcement of a unilateral 
position which would have done much 
towurd shaping u regime for thc decp 
sl'a floor, its position is now amhiguous. 
.I udging by the intense interest which 
has been generated in the international 
community by the Malta proposal at the 
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22nd General Assembly and by discus-
sion taking placc in other forums, the 
time left to the Unitcd States to exer-
cise its initiative may be running out. 
Wait and See. For those who assert 
that we do not yet ha\'e enough infor-
mation about the deep ocean floor and 
its possible uses, the obvious means of 
arriving at a regime for the seabed is on 
a ease-by-ease basis as man builds up 
experience in the environment. The 
argument in favor of this approach is 
not only that it is the pragmatic way of 
approaching any problem, but also the 
way in which the bulk of the law of the 
sea has been crcated over the centuries--
each use or claim by one state being 
either acceded to or resisted by others 
in the international community, the 
process of action and reaction gradually 
creating a body of precedents which 
harden into the status of law.28 The 
Judge Advocate General ofthe Navy has 
recently stated that the lesson of centu-
ries of legal history is that "law cannot 
be prefabricated in abstract codifi-
cation. "29 
Perhaps the most ardent advocate of 
letting the regime of the seabed develop 
by custom is Professor Myres McDougal. 
At the 1967 Law of the Sea Institute at 
the University of Rhode Island, at 
which he delivered the opening paper, 
he stated: 
Another obvious feature [of the 
international decisioilmaking process] 
(and this accounts for my animus 
against conferences) is that historically 
most international law has been madc 
by eustom--by people creating expecta-
tions in each other about the require-
ments for future decision by simply 
co-operating or engaging in collabora-
tive activities. Such co-operation 
creates expectations about the uni-
formities in decision that are expected 
and required. The great bulk of our 
inhcritt'd prescriptions in the law of 
tht' S('a had t111'ir oril!in in this way. and 
when th,' l'ollllllllnily ;Il'hi,',"'~ It'/.<i$ia-
tiVI' prescription of this kind ther<' is 
sollie guarantee of its rationality. That 
the sallle persons-nation-state officials 
--must be hoth (~hiln;lIIts :I[.:ainst the 
community and ded.;ion-makers offers 
some safeguard against exaggerated, 
inrIa ted claims. If what I elaim I must 
concede to you, and if I am, in turn, a 
judge as we)) as a claimant, there is, the 
history of the law of the sea suggests, a 
chance to clarify common interest. In 
the present posture of world affairs, 
when a great confcrcnce is called and 
the representatives of the statcs gather 
around the table, they come with all 
their perspectives, with instructions 
about the total policies of their states, 
the policies that relate not only to the 
law of the sea but to other things. 
... There are so many intrusions of 
considcrations that have no relation to 
thc law of thc sea that cven the people 
who are most eompctcnt to makl! thc 
law of the sea are not allowed to do so. 
Hence, until we can, by traditional 
customary process, secure a greater 
consensus, a greater degree of clarity 
about what the common interests of 
peoples of the world are in relation to 
the important contemporary problems 
in the public order of the oceans, I 
think we should go very slow in en-
couraging a call for more con-
ferences.30 
Obviously, if this step-by-step meth-
od of proceeding could be achieved, it 
would be the most desirable way of 
proceeding. Unfortunately, there are 
several difficulties which would be en-
countered in accomplishing it. The first 
is that it reflects an essentially European 
and American conecpt of intemational 
law which the newly emerged stutes 
regard as designed to protect and defend 
strong and privileged position. It neces-
sarily assumes that law will be created 
by the practices of those nations ad-
vanced and strong enough to carry out 
activities in the particular environment 
involved. The rapid decolonization of 
the world and the increasing weight of 
the new states in international affairs--at 
least at the U.N. General Assembly--
create a substantial doubt that the 
Ir:ulilional prol'l'~$ ean funclion as it did 
ill till' pa':I.:11 Thl' 11}5B :lI1l1 1%0 I.aw 
of IIIl' :-;,'a Con rl'rI'IIl'I'': prm'itll' :;IH'l'ifil' 
examples of Ihl~ rclul'lance of Ihe new 
states to be bound by traditional prin-
ciples crealed by the colonial powers 
hcforc thcy werc cvcn in existenee.32 
The second difficulty is that a "wait 
and sec" approach would probably lead 
toward ex elusive claims by states, thus 
forfciting any chancc for the adoption 
of any other type of regime (such as 
sharcd usc or an international rcgime). 
This rcsult follows partly from the 
impctus of nationalism, as discussed 
abovc, and partly from thc currcntly 
opcn·cmlcd definition of the conti-
ncnL11 shelf.33 The effcets of the lattcr 
principle arc already being felt, at leusL 
in United Slales practice. The I )cpart-
ment of Intcrior has issucd five oil leases 
for cxploitation of areas off the Pacific 
coast of thc Unitcd Statcs which are 
bcyond thc 200 mctcr depth of thc 
Contincntal Shelf Convention, thus 
bringing into play the second criterion 
of that Convcntion-·exploitability. 
Thcse arcas arc from 12 to 32 miles 
from shorc and at watcr dcpths up to 
1,500 feet.34 A lcasc for sea floor 
phosphatc nodule mining somc 40 miles 
off thc California coast in water depths 
to 4,000 feet has also been granted.35 
Additionally, as early as 1961. the 
Associate Solicitor, Division of Puhlie 
Lands, Dcpartmcnt of Interior, stated 
thc opinion that by ratifying the Conti-
nental Shelf Convention, thc Unitell 
Sllltl~ had " ... lIsserted rights to the 
scahed and subsoil as far seaward as 
exploitlltion is possiblc. "36 As other 
states sce opportunities for possible 
profit in such leases, thcy too will be 
quick to follow the U.S. examplc. And 
what the United Slates claims for itsclf, 
it must be prcpared to recognize on a 
rcciprocal basis when claimed by other 
nations. 
Slill a third difficulty, one which has 
already bcen touched upon, is the 
strong impetus, both within and outside 
the United States, for international 
cooperation in tlw esLlIhlishment of 1I 
n'~ime now, while the world is lit lhe 
threshold of profitable exploitation of 
the decp sca floor and before a new 
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form of "colonial exploitation" is 
touched off. The resolutions of a num-
ber of committees and commissions 
calling for such action have been men-
tioned in Chapters I and IV. Addition-
ally, the U.N. debate on the Malta 
rcsolution in the fall of 1967 showed a 
broad consensus in favor of the United 
Nations assuming jurisdiction of the 
problem under broad terms of rcfer-
ence.37 In opposition to this position, 
official U.S. spokesmen have asserted 
that knowledgc of the sca floor cnviron-
ment and U.S. interests therein lire 
insufficiently known to permit the 
United States to take a position on a 
regime for the sea floor. That position is 
in remarkable parallel with the position 
taken by the U.S. Government with 
respect to a regime for outer space in 
the early years of the space age. For 
example, in 1958 the Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State testified before 
a Senate Committee that: 
•.. we are inclined to view with great 
reserve any such suggestions as that the 
principles of the law of space should be 
codified ... Ulltil we ascertaill mally 
more facts wilh respect to eOllditiol~ 
ill space. Basieall y. it is the posi tiOIl of 
our Government that the law of space 
should be based upon the facts of 
space and that there is very much more 
Ihan we have to Ir:arn ahollllhe eondi. 
tions (:xislillg ill spm:t: hdort: WI: shall 
be able to say what shaU be Ihe legal 
principles applicable thereto.3S 
Nonetheless, only a little over 8 years 
later, the United States was not only a 
signatory, but also a prime advocate, of 
a treaty which codified a great number 
of legal rules applicable to outer space 
and the uses thereof, although, admit-
tedly, it did not attemp t to deal with 
issues " ... not ripe for international 
negotiation. "39 
The U.N. Resolution may have sct in 
motion a similar pattern of action for 
tilt' law of the 131:11 floor. Thilt IlIw lhuB 
lIIay not be allowed the luxury of a 
leisurely, step-by-step developmcnt such 
as marked the creation of international 
490 
law in other areas in carlicr ccnturies. 
From Presidcnt Truman's Contincntal 
Shelf Proclamation in 1945, only 13 
years clapsed until an international con· 
ference adopted the Continental Shelf 
Convention in 1958. With respect to 
outer space, the pace was even faster--
less than 10 years from the birth of the 
space age in 1957 to the signing of the 
Outer Space Treaty in 1967. Even less 
time may be available for "inner space." 
Summary. As has been seen with 
respect to outer space, a "wait and see" 
approach to the establishment of a legal 
regime eventually developed into the 
negoti.ation of a treaty embracing those 
elements where a consensus had de-
veloped and where the two major 
powers recognized it was in their mutual 
interest to accept mutual restraints.40 
Contrary to what might have been 
anticipated frodt earlier development of 
international law by custom and prac-
tice of states, this process did not 
occupy a very long period from first 
orbiting space vehicle to treaty signing. 
Although the Continental Shelf Doc-
trine started out on a different procedu-
ral path--unilateral dcclaration--the 
ultimate result was also a treaty and in 
almost as rapid a sequence. If deep sea 
technology progresses as fast as space 
technology--and as fast as its practi-
tioners predict--the period between first 
action and final treaty signing may be 
even further compressed in the case of a 
regime for the deep seabed. Thus, the 
options on a method of proceeding will 
~apidly narrow. 
VI--CONCLUSIONS 
The explosion of undcrsea tech-
nology has placed man near the thresh-
old of greatly increased activitics on the 
seabed of the decp ocean. Until the 
present time. the natllfl~ and extl'nt of 
those activities have heen :;lIch that the 
answer to the question, "Whose is the 
ocean floor?" has not had a very great 
influence on such activities. Most scabcd 
activities to date have been confined to 
the Continental Shclf. Those fewactivi-
ties which have bccn conducted in the 
deep ocean floor have not gencrally 
been of the type which have resulted in 
competitive assertions of exclusive 
rights or claims to jurisdiction. As man's 
activities on the deep ocean floor in-
crease, however, the question of juris-
diction will become more important. 
The Possible Drift Toward Coastal 
State Jurisdiction. The development 
which would probably create the great-
est pressure for a resolution of the issue 
of jurisdiction would be the oppor-
tunity or need for mining the surface 
mineral deposits of the deep ocean 
floor. Because an entrepreneur must be 
assured sufficient rights to allow him to 
recover investment costs and gain a 
reasonable profit, the establishment of 
some system of jurisdiction is concomi-
tant to exploitation.! In theory it 
should make little difference to the 
entrepreneur whether his rights flow 
from a national or an international 
body, his primary interest being in the 
scope of the rights granted. In actuality, 
however, a businessman is accustomed 
to operate under national jurisdiction. 
The undersea mining entrcprenCllr, 
thcreforc, will instinctively seck a na-
tional rather than an international spon-
sorship for his operating rights.2 This in 
turn will cause him to influence coastal 
states toward assertion of claims to the 
natural resources in the areas in which 
he seeks to operate. 
We have seen that nationalism al-
ready creates an inclination for states to 
cx tcnd thcir exclusive claims farther and 
farthcr to sea} When this natura! I'fl!-
disposition is reinforced by a prospect 
of monetary gain, thc likcly result is an 
extension outward of coastal state juris-
didiou unc\c'r the authority of Ihc' Con-
tini'uta! Shelf Couvl'ntion. T!w O!"'IWC! 
definition of the shelf in that Conven-
tion provides the opportunity for such 
seaward creep of tl((: OIlter boundary. 
Once hegun, the trend would be diffi-
cult to reverse:1- The uiLima te result 
might be the division of the seahed 
among coastal states as discussed in 
Chapter I V. While such a rel,rime might 
he beneficial fwm the point of view of 
the development of natural resources, it 
would pose serious dangers to the free-
dom of the high seas and to other uses 
of the seahed and superjacent watcrs. As 
coastal state claims to limited jurisdic-
tions over segments of the high seas 
tend to ripen into more extensive juris-
dictional claims, sometimes going as far 
as full sovereignty,5 a regime based on 
coastal staLe jurisdiction, it is submitted, 
poses a threat to the freedom of the seas 
and is not a proper hasis for a regime for 
the deep seabed. 
If that proposition is accepted, it 
would logically follow that a "wait and 
sce" approach, as currently advocated 
by spokesmen of the U.S. Government, 
would also be unaccepLahle, since it 
carries the danger of allowing a drift in 
the direction of coastal state jurisdic-
tion. According to information provided 
to a Suhcommittee of the House For-
eign Affairs Conl1l1ittee, 15 nations have 
already licensed mining operalions be-
yond the 200 meter depLh.6 The U.S. 
Department of Interior, in I,rranting oil 
and mineral leases to ocean floor areas 
heyond thc 200 llIeter depth, has rein-
forced this trend.7 Thus, a "wait and 
scc" approach, in acldition to being 
sOlllewhat impracticable in thc light of 
the U.N. action already initiated, would 
be contrary to the concept of freedom 
of thc seas and would not forward basic 
U.S. intcrests. 
Un acceptability of Res NuIlius and 
Res Communis Theories. A rebrime 
hased on the res nrLiliILs concept has 
been found to provide a generally favor-
ahle climate for all the types of sealled 
activities considered in Chaptl:r IV. 
Thew arc:, howl:ver, practical difficulties 
in applying the gc:nerally aeecpted "cf-
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fective occupation" Lest to the sealled 
(which would he required hy this doc-
trine);B moreover, this sysLem would be 
unacceptable to the developing states, as 
debate before the First Commillee of 
the (;elleral Assemhly ill the fall of 
1967 has revealed.9 
In an earlier day when international 
law was shaped almost exclusively by 
the practices of the dominant powers, 
this would not have been an obstacle to 
clevclopment of the law along these 
lines.l O Today, however. the views of 
the smaller, less-developed staLes cannot 
he ignored. This is particularly true in 
the present case, hecause the U.N. 
General Assembly has already become 
deeply involved in the problem. The 
sheer number of the smaller states in 
that hody gives them a significant in-
fluence on the outcome of issues there. 
Ten of the 35 memhers of the Ad /Joc 
Committee have gained their statehood 
since World \\' ar II. Thus. a rel,rime based 
on the res nulliILs theory seems beyond 
attainment even if it were the desire of 
the United States and other major 
powers to seck such a regime. 
The res communis concept has also 
been found to provide a favorable cli-
mate for a numher of types of seabed 
activities, but the fact that it cannot 
offer the exclusive ri~hts required for 
mineral resource development makes it 
an unattractive option. [n addiLion, it 
suffers from the same unattractiveness 
to underdeveloped states as the res 
nullius concept, and it too would appear 
to he unaUainable in today's interna-
tio nal cHma te. 
The Remaining Altematives. Of the 
hypothetical regillies examined, only 
one emerges as :t practical alternative to 
the unaeceptahle coastal state regime. 
That is some sort of international juris-
diction. In view of the dangers of the 
"wait and sec" approach, the alternative 
methods availahle for arriving at such a 
n:gimc: appl:ar to hi: unilateral proclama-
tion and internationallll!gotiation. 
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The events in the United Nations in 
the fall of 1967 have narrowed the 
options available to the United States 
even farther. Having sponsored the idea 
of an Ad Hoc Committee to examine all 
aspects of the Malta proposal, it is now 
committed to the support of the efforts 
of that Committee)1 Under those cir-
cums~ances, it would appear that any 
~ssertIons of U.S. position at this time 
would have to be within the framework 
of the Ad Hoc Committee. In essence 
then, the course open to the United 
States is to take the lead in the discus-
sions within the Ad Hoc Committee to 
develop a regime which is in the U.S. 
interest. The obstacle to accomplish-
ment of this course of action is the 
officially asserted position that the 
United States is not yet prepared to 
take an official stand on the legal status 
of the seabed because of the primitive 
state of knowledge about the environ-
ment and the poorly perceived national 
interest therein. It is submitted, how-
ever, that if the United States is to have 
a decisive influence on the work of the 
Committee and the regime which may 
result from its work, it must formulate a 
positiv.e national .position rapidly. 
O~h~rwlse, events will pass it by, per-
mltlmg only reaction to proposals put 
forward by other states rather than 
taking the lead. 
It is further submilled that the 
United States is not in such a state of 
~gnoran.ce .as to prevent it from perceiv-
mg baSIC mterests' and guiding the pro-
ceedings in a direction which will pro-
tect those interests. Man's knowledge 
need not be perfect to permit him to 
anticipate needs and provide a basic 
framework of rules to govern relation-
ships that may exist. Obviously, the lcss 
perfect the knowledge, the more flexi-
ble the framework must be. In this 
connection, it is appropriate to ask how 
milch was known ahout the continental 
shelf lit the timc of the 19·~5 'J'rullllln 
Proclamation. The answer seems to be 
"Not really very much." The pres~ 
release which aceompanicd that Proela-
mation stated: 
Petroleum geologists bcliclJc that 
portions of the Continental Shelf be-
yond the three-mile limit contain 
valuable oil deposits. Thc study of 
subsurface structurcs associated with 
oil deposits which have been dis-
covered along the Gulf Coast of Texas, 
~or instan.ee, indicates that eorrespond-
mg depOSits may underlie the offshore 
or submerged land. The trend of oil· 
productive salt domes extends directly 
1I1to the Gulf of Mexico off the Texas 
Coast.12 
Similarly, Secretary of Interior Harold 
L. Ickes, in an interview a month later 
called the area "unexplored. "13 Dr: 
K.O. Emery of the Woods Hole Oceano-
graphic Institution has stated in a recent 
monograph preparcd for the Depart-
ment of Interior that knowledge gained 
from exploration of the continental 
shelf by the petroleum industry, which 
began little more than 15 years ago, has 
probably produced knowledge of the 
shelf which exceeds the gains from all 
other sources. Nevertheless, he points 
out that even today, only the shelves 
adjacent to the most industrialized 
countries are at all well known. And 
even .for these best known shelves, large 
gaps m knowledge exist)4 
Anothcr factor which should reduce 
apprehension ahont ncgotilltion within 
the United NlItions fn"llllework ill thl! 
experience in connection with the Outer 
Space Treaty. That experience would 
tend to indicate that the U.S.S.R. and 
the United States can, where their inter-
ests are parallel, resist the injection of 
issues not ripe for international negotia-
tion. The analysis in Chapter IV as well 
as the preliminary debate in the First 
Committee in the fall of 1967 indicate 
that in this area the interests of the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
seem to be generally parallel. 
Ouh!r Boundary of the Continental 
Shelf. A suhstlllllilll initilll IIl'nefit which 
could flow from negotiations within the 
Ad Hoc Committee would be the de-
wiol'lIll'nt of an inLl'rna!ional 1:()nSl'n~IIS 
on an IInambil-(lIous ollLer bOllndary for 
the continenlai shclf hcrore the trend 
toward exclllsive coasLal sLate claims can 
gather further momentum. Agreement 
on this issue is fUlHiamenLal to any 
settlement of the legal sLatus of the 
deep ocean floor. Otherwise, the boun-
dary betwecn the continental shelf and 
the deep ocean hed would he a constant 
source of uneerLainty and tension. [n 
this connection, the Continental Shelf 
Convention provides that it is open for 
revision 5 years after it enLers into 
force. Since it entered into force in 
11)(l't,lS iL will be open for revision in 
1'J()9. A number of commentaLors have 
suggesLed the need for revision of the 
boundary at that time.l 6 
The mere fact that the Convention is 
open for revision, however, docs not 
mean that it can or will he revised. A 
revision would require the development 
of a consensus on a proper, fixed 
IimiL--a task Lh,lt appears no closer to 
accomplishment today than it was in 
1958, when the Convention was nego-
tiated aL· Geneva. There are, however, 
two fae!ors Lodar which were not 
present in 1958 ~nd would tend to 
suggest a more favorable climate for 
agreement. The first is that with the 
prospect of more than token activities 
ou the seabell wiLhin the foreseeable 
future, there should hc a f:,'Tcater apprc· 
ciation on the part of thc statcs that the 
problem is a rcal one, involving impor-
tant national and intcrnational interests, 
and not just a discussion of abstractions. 
Thc second is thc manner in which thc 
prohlcm is bcing approached. The Ad 
Hoc Committcc is not adopting a purely 
"political" or "Icgal" approach to the 
problem but has been directed to 
examinc the seicntific, technical, eco-
nomic, legal and other aspects of the 
8l'abrd and ocean floor at.d to indieatc 
pral'lil'~11 ml'ans !o promoh~ in!I'rna-
Lional l'oolll'ra!ion in !hl~ l'xplora!ioll, 
l'llIlt'l'rva!ion mill IISl' of the 8cabcd allli 
ocean floor.l 7 A hopeful sign for a 
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favorable OULeOIlIl" Il\I this m;pecL of Lhl' 
problem was Lhe ,~(lll:;tructive naLure of 
the dehate in the First Committcc. 
Implicit in the remarks of almost all the 
spokesmen was an apprcciation of the 
danger of cxaggcratcd, cxclusivc claims 
hy coastal statcs.l 8 Thc rcpresentativc 
of Swcden suggested (and his views werc 
shared hy several other governments) 
that some measures should hc taken to 
freeze the prcsent situation and to 
prevent claims to the ocean bed until 
thc dcliberations had resulted in some 
conclusions.l9 
Final Remarks. The last year has seen 
the first tentativc stcps by thc interna-
tional community toward cstablishing 
the basis for a framework of law to 
govern the scabed and subsoil of the 
decp ocean arcas, The effect of these 
steps has been to narrow the options 
open to thc Unitcd States, both as to 
the character of an ultimate regimc 
which it might seck to support its 
national intercsts and as to the method 
it might choose to reach that goal. 
Although the U.S. Government might 
havc wished that this issue had not bel'n 
raised within thc Unitcd Nations quiLe 
so soon, tlte cvents arc not wholly 
unfavorablc to U.S. intercsts. 
In l'rl'a!illl-( Lhl' :Id Hoe Cllllllnilll'!', 
the Assemhly acted conservatively, 
steering nway from a hroad attack 
which might have Icd immediately to 
the drafting of a seabcd treaty or to 
vesting jurisdiction over the. seahed in 
the United Nations, Instcad it directed 
the Committec's activities toward the 
fact-finding and study arcas, asking that 
the results hc reported to the 23rd 
General Assembly. Additionally, the 
First Committee debate had the benefi-
cial effect of again focusing the mcm-
bcrs' attcntion on thc advcrse effects 
which would follow the unlimited ex-
tcnsion of national jurisdictions over 
broad expanses of the sea bottom, If 
this should serve as a dampcr on the 
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illnpll'lIl 11'1111,'111'), 1111 IIIl! parI (If slal.'s 
lowanl exlellliing Iheir eonlinclltal :;hclf 
hounllarics oUlward, L1ral resull alone 
would he a worlhwhilc accomplishment. 
Nevertheless, the General Assembly 
aelion has crealed the need for timely 
aelion on the part of the Uniled Stales 
Government to develop a national posi-
lion on the issues raised by Resolulion 
No. 2:340 (XXII) in order that it lIIay 
seize the iniliative in the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee and wilhin the 23rd General 
Assembly, to which the CommiLtee 
must report. Unless it 1II0ves in a timely 
manner, il may find iLself in a position 
where it can only reael to what may be 
wholly unacceptable proposals from 
other states. 
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